The considerations which shaped British policy in the Sudan, especially in the South, were practical and pragmatic, not humanitarian and altruistic. The Southern Policy which grew out of these considerations was, therefore, also practical rather than humanitarian. This Southern Policy required a certain amount of education in order to accomplish two things; first, the indigenous inhabitants of the South could replace those government personnel serving the Government in the South and second, the needs of the Native Administration program would be met. The educational support for these government requirements was to come from the Missions. With financial support and professional supervision from the Government, a system of schools was developed which was staffed entirely by Christian missionaries and small numbers of native teachers trained by Christian missionaries. The Government's expectations diverged further and further from the missions' accomplishments during the late 1930s to mid-1940s. As this fact penetrated the Government's educational and political establishment, hostility toward the missionaries and their activities increased. This became so pronounced by the end of World War II that 1946 can be used as the terminal date for the Government-mission relationship based on the considerations and requirements mentioned above.

     MacMichael frequently mentioned protecting the South from slavery, exploitation and inundation under a tide of Islam. [1] It becomes apparent that from his tenure as Civil Secretary until that of Robertson, the real emphasis was pragmatic. How to get by with a minimum of controversy and expenditure remained the fundamental policy consideration.

     In 1928 MacMichael had addressed himself to the question of the future of the South and the policy to be undertaken.

In this way (the maintenance of separate educational systems) we shall show ourselves more truly to be their friends than by tipping them over the brink of a dangerously easy slope; and in time we shall reap our own advantage for a series of self-contained racial units will be developed with structure and organisation based on the solid rock of indigenous traditions and beliefs...the sense of tribal pride and independence will grow, and in the process a solid barrier will be created against the insidious political intrigue which must in the ordinary course of events increasingly beset our path in the North. [2]

     Separate development of the South was certainly one of MacMichael's aims but from this and other statements, it is clear that the regions were seen as being component parts of the framework of the Sudan and not with the idea of some for Uganda, some for Egypt, etc. A difficult task, especially in the South, was being undertaken with minimal capital and manpower resources. Programs of development would have to be limited to available materials since Egypt couldn't be allowed back, the North was Muslim, the British Exchequer was suffering through the Depression, and Whitehall did not want to be bothered. The South was to be

organized, strengthened, and educated so that, at some point, it could protect its interests against any northern threat. The Southern Policy was divisive but contemplated some sort of unitary future.

     The Government expected that its policies, supported by the missions, would end the threat of exploitation from the North and would result in a common language which would spread slowly, using not only missionaries and civil servants but also the Sudan Defence Force and police personnel. A southern identity and a lingua franca, distinct from the North, would emerge. [3] The expectation was that once the Southern Policy had succeeded, some sort of political integration would be feasible. This integration was in the distant future, the reconstruction of Southern society, the fostering of modernizing institutions, the rationalization of the ethnic and linguistic complexities; all would consume decades of British attention bearing fruit in the last years of the twentieth century. That at least was the schedule which came to the minds of those few who took the time to contemplate the "what are we doing here?" question. [4] Further evidence in support of the assertion that the British were up to nothing more than what was just described can be found throughout the Foreign Office files for the 1930s. After 1936, as has been mentioned elsewhere, policy shifted to a more overtly anti-Egyptian tone but still it appears that the South's development was toward that of a component. of the Sudan. The language issue was not to separate them from the North

but was to bind the various tribal elements of the South more cohesively so they would have the same unity of linguistic identity that Arabic gave the Muslims in the North.

The adoption of group languages should gradually ensure the spread of these languages in various areas, thereby stimulating the indigenous institutions and organisations to which reference is made in my second paragraph above. The use of Arabic among the inhabitants themselves should tend to die out, while at the same time the policy which, theoretically at least, has been in force for some years, and which aims at making the language of government offices as educated local boys are forthcoming from the intermediate schools should work to produce the same result. [5]

     The] achievement of the goals of the Southern Policy required the participation of non-government organizations in the conduct of that policy. The Government found schools in operation, often at a very rudimentary level, and chose to incorporate them into the conduct of policy. Relying on financial subsidies pegged on favorable inspection reports, a relationship of mutual benefit was to result. There were men of vision in the Sudan Political Service who realized that the missions were not providing the necessary educational services, yet there were no substantial moves made toward breaking the missions' monopoly on education in the South until the end of World War II. The basis of the relationship between the Government and the missions remained one of practicality.

     "Why did the British leave the schools in the South under mission monopoly for so long?" "Why weren't Foreign Office pressures for a government system productive before World War II?" These two

questions were among the most productive during the Interview phase of this research and the responses give valuable additional insight into the workings of the minds of the executors of the Southern Policy and how the missionaries fit into that policy. The most common explanation for the half century of mission monopoly was simple economy. The government needed trained workers and teachers, and the lower their wages, the better. If the educational effort could be limited to meeting these needs, a minimum of expenditure would result. [7] Complicating these simple observations were two Interrelated facts: first, the South was not economically self-sufficient, revenues from the North and from Egypt had been expended for Its development. Second, the mission societies in the early years were economically self-sufficient and would not have been susceptible to the Government's plans. The practical reality was that cheap services were required, draining as little as possible from the rest of the country, and a way was found to meet this requirement in terms of education. One document suggests that when enough cheap staff had been produced the service of education should be scaled down to prevent "wastage." [8] The Governor-General under whom MacMichael initiated the Southern Policy gave the position thusly:

In pursuing this policy, the Government was Influenced by the following considerations: A system of government schools would have entailed either the engagement of a large staff of British masters, whose recruitment --if the right type were to be obtained-prevented almost insuperable difficulties and Involved expenditure out of all proportion to the needs of the situation, or the utilization

of Sudanese teachers trained in the Mahometan areas of Northern Sudan. The latter method would, of course, have been contrary to the general policy in that it would have introduced Islam at a most vulnerable point. [9]

     The fact that the Southern Policy's inception coincided with the Depression has already been dealt with. This, of course, guaranteed that there would be no competition with the missions by government since retrenchment and austerity were the prevailing concerns. The low cost of mission education made them even more desirable as the financial situation grew worse and worse. "Care and maintenance" were the motto of those years, although some realized that this was a violation of the assumed obligations of the British rulers in the South. [10] Apparently, economy sometimes obstructed other goals. In one of his final official reports, Martin Parr, Governor of Equatoria Province, made the following observation:

The numbers of Southern boys who have replaced Northerners in clerical and accountancy work is very considerable. The effect of such employment and replacement up the progress of Southern Policy is I believe almost Nil... The result is a very considerable economy in Sudan Government budget, but no benefit that I can see to the communities from which they come in particular or to the 'Policy' in general ... a number of them might have become good teachers, of which the dearth is appalling. [11]

     It was well into the war years before the financial stringencles Imposed on southern development, particularly in education, began to be relaxed. In 1944, Newbold pinned all Southern development to the question of education and requested approval for a policy of educational and economic expansion in all the Southern Provinces ...(with) the real and ultimate key to the spread of Southern education is a corps of properly-trained and adequately-paid Southern Sudanese teachers. [12]

     Yet even at this late time the needs of the South remained subordinate to the Khartoum Government's concern for stability in the North. In Robertson's memoirs he describes the long campaign to pacify and organize the South after the Reconquest, then addresses himself to the lack of financial support for development in the following words:

Finance too was limited; it had to come from the North, and the development of social services and economic progress there had necessarily to have first call on the slender resources of the Government. Especially was this so since the South seemed unlikely in the foreseeable future to pay dividends on investments made to develop it. [13]

     While finance was obviously the main rationale for the maintenance of a mission monopoly over southern education, there were other fairly powerful practical considerations which influenced the British. The residue of Victorian morality and duty noted earlier played its part. The mission societies had been involved in education throughout the Empire since the late eighteenth century and In many respects, the case In the Sudan was as one would have expected. 'Who else would have done it?" was a common response.

     Most of the British simply never thought about it. It would have been difficult to recruit educational staff for the southern Sudan from the secular world who would work for the pittance the missions

received. [14] Fr. Bano put it more bluntly when he said simply: "Nobody wanted to go to the South." Once the missions established themselves, it rarely occurred to anyone in the Sudan Government to consider their replacement. Where would you get the money, buildings, etc.? Wouldn't the same amount of money go much further in mission hands than in a Government system?" There was also a strong feeling that religious education was necessary in order to cushion the shock of Southerners being brought into contact with modernity.

     In addition to building a separate identity and spreading English as a lingua franca in the South, the Government also expected mission-trained southerns to strengthen their Native Administration scheme. As was discussed earlier, Native Administration had been an attempt to pass on the labor-intensive activities of administrative and justice to existing (or recreated) tribal authorities. [15] After the assassination of Sir Lee Stack and the subsequent expulsion of Egyptian officials from the Sudan, an enlarged requirement for Sudanese staff resulted. Because of the distrust the British felt toward educated northern Sudanese--the effendiyya--they felt forced to look elsewhere to meet these requirements. Rather than increasing the size and expense of the British administrative community in the South, tribal chiefs were appointed as second-class magistrates, salaried, and put under their local District Commissioner as quasi-Government officials. This had worked in the North and West and a fair amount of true devolution

took place in the 1930s. The Sudan Government was able to avoid some of the mistakes made in Nigeria where the British, ignorant of the true nature of political power in the various tribal hierarchies sometimes threw their weight behind tribal personalities with no executive status. They were, to a great extent, unaware of the intricacies of tribal politics. In the Sudan the government had avoided this problem by hiring anthropologists, the most famous being Evans-Pritchard, and, as a result, there were few instances of backing the wrong faction. [16] In the South Native Administration could not work effectively. The tribes had remained intensely conservative and moderately xenophobic, preventing much penetration by the government's program. An even more serious problem was the instability of tribal authority in some of the smaller tribes which had only just barely survived the Mahdiyya. There was little in the way of foundation upon which to erect the Native Administrations. Where they were successful they had immediate benefits, as had been anticipated, but a long-term problem was also exacerbated. [17] If there was to be a Sudanese nation at some point, then any policy which maintained or revitalized tribal loyalties would ultimately prove an obstacle to that nation's unity. Critics of the idea popularized the "Whipsnade" epithet to describe their perception of the conservative and unprogressive spirit of indirect rule.

But I have been no less impressed by the dangers of what I call the Whipsnade School of Indirect Rule, whose chief ideal seems to be the creation of an enclave in which the native is to remain as little changed as possible with the British official as friendly head-keeper. [18]

     Indirect rule began to have visible effect toward the end of the period under discussion and the emphasis on education shifted from the training of clerical and medical personnel for local government toward a tribal orientation. In the Williams Report it was directed that the missionaries begin to emphasize teacher training in order to provide tribes with their own educational cadres who would spread the English language to a greater audience and who would also strengthen the sense of tribal unity and custom. [19] Slowly this aspect of the Government-mission relationship began to produce results. A more educated and enlightened southerner began to play a part in tribal life and by 1937 this development was noteworthy enough to warrant mention in the Governor-General's Report wherein he noted the decision of several Sudanese - to leave government service in order to take over as chiefs in local chiefs' courts. [20] These men were, almost without exception, former students in one of the mission schools, but with so vast an area it must be said that what effect these few mission-school graduates were having on overall conditions in the South was minimal. [21]

As late as 1944 the Civil Secretary was lamenting the slowness with which the educated Southerner was gaining influence in his milieu.

I should like to repeat that Southern education will never be a success unless it is pursued at all stages simultaneously, i.e., from bush-school to Makerere...to get one or two Dinkas through Loka to a secondary school In Uganda and even on to Makerere and back to Dinkaland as beacons in the educational darkness would be worth a lot....

Some of our most striking successes in Local Government and rural development in the North have been due to one young tribal chief having completed his way through an intermediate school and Gordon College. [22]

     The curricula of the mission schools did little to foster the kind of leadership mentioned above. Throughout the 1928-1946 period the course of instruction at the elementary and intermediate level was geared more toward clerical pursuits than leadership training. Before the government entry into Southern education there had been no common curriculum guiding the various missionary educators. This situation was changed as a result of the appointment of the Resident Inspector of Southern Education and the Rejaf Conference. [23] Curricula were developed for both the elementary vernacular and intermediate schools; bush schools were never really reduced to a formal curriculum. These curricula are shown below, but it must be reiterated that lessons in the elementary schools were taught in the vernacular while those in the intermediate schools were in English.

     Elementary students entered school between the ages of six and eight and were subject to the following curriculum: [24]

     In the final two years the six hours devoted to studying the vernacular were split with some of the time devoted to English. This was their first contact with English as many had been learning a vernacular up until this time. The time allotted to Agriculture/Handiwork was devoted to gardening, domestic chores, dormitory or building maintenance, etc. Since almost all the elementary schools were boarding schools and there was a scarcity of funds and resources, the schools strove for self-sufficiency. For the six year intermediate course, the curriculum was expanded, both in time and subject matter, as follows: [25]

     The distinct impression one takes away from the Inspector Reports and reports by the Directors and the Secretary of Education is that the curriculum and the classroom instruction were often only vaguely related. In the Williams Report the following observation was made:

In theory the system has been soundly constructed with the Bush School feeding the Elementary Vernacular and the latter leading on to the Intermediate stage, supplemented by the Trade and Girls Schools. But in practice the whole edifice has been undermined and rendered unsound by the fact that the foundations have not been well and surely laid. [26]

     This curriculum had evolved a bit by 1946; the entry to the four year elementary course had been set at seven or eight years old. The intermediate course had been shortened to four years with entry at age eleven to thirteen. That was as far as the system went in the South. After age 15-17, the school leaver either went to work for the mission or the Government, went back to his tribe, or went on to secondary school in Uganda. Intermediate school leavers were not sent to Khartoum. [27] One of Sir Christopher Cox's deepest regrets is the failure on his part to see the need for secondary education in the South. [28] That was the curriculum: an English/American spread of subjects taught in at least one and often two foreign languages to boys from the ages of seven to seventeen, then nothing unless one left the country. [29]

     The conflict between the missions' goals and government's expectations was discussed in the preceding chapter. The realization that missionaries were not devoting themselves wholeheartedly to the curricula began to have an adverse influence on the Government-mission relationship toward the mid-1930s. Before this the annual inspection reports were moderately approving of the efforts of the various missions. One gets the impression from these reports that the education being provided was up to the level expected by the Inspector. [30] As can be seen from the map, one Resident Inspector and his Assistant Inspector were physically unable or just barely able to adequately inspect all the schools receiving government subsidies. This may explain the contrast between the mildly favorable inspection reports and some of the nasty criticisms being

made against the missionaries by Province Governors and District Commissioners. The latter group were in much more frequent contact with missionary activities. The problem of government inspection became acute in 1932 when retrenchment of the Government reduced the size of the Inspectorate to the Resident inspector himself. [31] After the education effort had more or less muddled along for almost a decade, the Government directed C. W. Williams, Assistant Director of Education, to evaluate the nature of the Government-mission relationship and report on the quality of the services being rendered by the missions. The Williams Report, a blunt, hard-hitting and critical evaluation was the result. This document was produced in an attempt to reform what had become a recognized embarrassment by the Government. By 1935-1936, the educational system had reached its nadir. What Williams found was the product of several factors: a lack of effective government oversight; a missionary community which had been subjected to severe financial stringency, and a half-hearted commitment to which the Government's requirements had become ingrained in the older sector of the mission community, especially the C.M.S. and the Verona Fathers. [32] Relations between the government and the missions were not good. M. O. Beshir uses the Williams Report as confirmation that the British and the missions were involved in a conspiracy to prevent the natural spread of Islamic unity from encompassing the South. This point will be dealt with in the last chapter but it must be pointed out here that, while the Williams Report was extremely critical, it was constructive criticism intended only to strengthen the education system.

     Basically the deterioration of the education system was to be corrected through consolidation, stricter accounting, and stiffer, more effective controls. The issue of control cut two ways. In the Williams Report and in interviews with Sir Christopher Cox it becomes obvious that the Resident Inspector was conscientiously making the best of a difficult situation but was ignored by both missions and government. This was hardly conducive to delivery of quality educational services.

     In discussing the devotion of duty of the Resident Inspector the Williams Report recommends:

It is suggested that they (Inspector reports) might be followed up more frequently from headquarters and measures concerted to see that suitable action is taken on them. At present his (Inspector's) voice is as the voice of one crying in the wilderness. He has been attempting the. impossible since he has been the sole educational representative in the South....As representing the Government side of the partnership and as its spokesman in educational matters in places far removed from the capital, he should receive strong support from headquarters. [33]

     The problem of consolidation must not have been of major concern to the missionaries. In 1936 the Presbyterians were blithely suggesting to their local District Commissioner that they be allowed to extend their work across the Ethiopian border to the Annuak in that country. Mussolini's troops had already invaded but the only advice given the Presbyterians was delay, not discouragement. [34] The problem of accounting produced one of the most eloquent statements to be found in the Williams Report.

It may be reiterated that the Missions are the trustees of Government for education and as such they receive substantial grants-in-aid for their educational work. Surely it is not asking very much of them that in return for the funds allotted to them they should take steps to see that the education which they provide is the best possible in the circumstances and not regard it as little but an unimportant adjunct to their real work of evangelism. [35]

     The Williams Report came out in 1936 and began to have some effect almost immediately. The records show that Presbyterians were proposing and approving the appointment of negroes, the Verona Fathers were trying to upgrade the quality of their English (a constant complaint of their D.C.'s and Province Governors as well as the Inspector was the dreadful English taught by the Italians), and the C.M.S. was easing Shaw out of the picture. [36]

     The whole mission-Government relationship underwent fundamental change in 1938 with the introduction of the Cox reforms. Cox is a landmark in educational development throughout the Sudan and ranks with Sir James Currie and V. L. Griffiths in terms of the influence exerted on upgrading and expanding the Condominium system of schools. After a year or so of assessing the system and policy he had inherited, he gained Symes' (the Governor-General) approval for a series of measures, the most important of which follow. The Governor-General's report discusses the broad provisions in terms of a large increase in the education budget, reorganization of schools, revision and improvement of syllabi, and ends by saying that "subsidies, conditional upon defined

standards of efficiency, will be paid by Government to the missionary societies." [37]

The details of the Cox plan were presented under eight major categories.

First, the bush schools were to upgraded and integrated into the curriculum as a school rather than a proselytizing center where some teaching took place. Second, teacher training was emphasized. Cox felt and still feels that this was an essential element of the reform.
Third, increased Government financial support for enlarged staff and improved buildings and equipment was proposed.
Fourth, Government grants were created which were to be awarded annually to the missions in order that they could send certain of their teaching staff to London for the Colonial Office education course. These "educationists" would eventually take over all teaching duties and the school system would be staffed with trained personnel. At the time of these reforms, hardly any of those teaching in the schools could have been called "trained."
Fifth, the plan called for the establishment of teacher training centers in all the mission spheres where Sudanese support could be adequately trained.

Sixth, girls' education was to be improved.
Seventh, the Inspectorate was enlarged and provided with more adequate transport to facilitate the increased responsibilities created.
Finally, it was stated clearly that the mission schools were to come more directly under Government oversight and control in order to guarantee that the increased financial expenditures were being applied properly. [38]

     The missions' reactions were mixed. The Presbyterians were happy since they had been more or less a client of the Government since the early 1930s. [39] The C.M.S. did not have much of a reaction for they had played a material part in drafting the reform proposals and seem to have been content with them. [40] The Verona Fathers were lukewarm. The secretary to the Roman Catholic Bishop in Khartoum observed that his mission would conform but noted that the new criteria for teacher training and the Colonial Course in London were being generally applied to all missions, yet the Verona Fathers were to receive a subvention calculated at a lower rate than both the C.M.S. or the Presbyterian subventions. [41] They had to upgrade and improve but were receiving less per capita support than their much smaller colleague societies were, a fact which raises the question of anti-Catholic and/or anti-Italian bias.

     Nineteen thirty-eight was the turning point. Sir Stewart Symes and Sir Christopher Cox instituted a series of reforms which.

were to be interrupted by war but even the partial reforms under taken before that event led to improvement. In the words of Symes, an activist and outspoken Governor-General:

An entire reorganization of the primitive educational system operated by the Christian Missions in the Southern Sudan will have as its main objectives the introduction of trained European (mostly British) teachers to all pivotal educational posts, an improved training of native teachers, elevation of the "bush" schools to a recognizable educational level, and the beginnings of a simple education for girls. It is also proposed to open a (state) elementary school for experimental purposes in the Dinka country, tone up the work of the three existing (Mission) intermediate schools and strengthen the (Government) educational inspectorate. [42]

     Most of the consequences of Italy's invasion of Abyssinia have already been touched upon, but its effect on the Government-mission relationship warrants a few more remarks. Pressure to get rid of the Italians was exerted by members of the SPS on the Governor-General which added to the Foreign Office pressures discussed in Chapter III. Once war broke out, the Italian missionaries in London for the Colonial Course were interned for the duration. This was complicated by the termination of Vatican and Verona financial support for the Verona Fathers and the disruption created by the enforced reorganization and addition of the Mill Hill Fathers as discussed in the chapter on the missions. The Italians had their defenders as well as opponents. In 1946, after discussing the apparent reliability of the Italians in wartime, the Governor of Equatoria concluded by noting that

The interruption to a badly needed educational system which is just beginning to be effective would be a setback from which it will take years to recover and be a serious administrative handicap. [43]

     By 1942 he had changed his tune somewhat and in his final report to the Civil Secretary, he saw the question thus:

Are the missionaries societies to be the Government's agents for education - and if "Yes" then are purely Italian missionary bodies to be kept as agents? .... The answer to the first being a qualified "Yes" - I should give the. answer "Nd" to the second question. Mr. Roseveare (Cox's successor) has recently asked me privately whether the V.F.M. have failed in Nilotic areas because (a) they are Roman Catholics (b) they are Italians (c) they are non-Government (d) they are white men (e) they are not Nilotics. They have failed for a combination of those reasons of which (a) and (b) are far the most important. I doubt whether a Roman Catholic priest will ever present education to a Nilotic as he wants it, or to the other tribes as we want it. I feel reasonably certain that an Italian priest never will. [44]

     This covert opposition to the efforts of the Italians was not limited to the Southern SPS. K. D. D. Henderson, the wartime Director of Public Security, was constantly searching for evidence of missionary-Fascist collusion but finding none. In 1944 even the Civil Secretary got into the spirit in a private letter he wrote to one of the southern District Commissioners:

We must use Italian missionaries while they are there and that is the policy. Some D.C.s fought with them illicitly. We have made up our minds, witness Central Government files, but we are not sure how long it is wise to keep this particular mission there. A decision to send them out depends on factors not under government control.... We must have schools of some sort as Government can't undertake bush schools or evangelization

and the people cannot become civilized without some faith on which to tie morals and paganism is not enough. [45]

     The Italian missionaries were unpopular with the SPS until the latter departed in 1956. Their long tenure in the South, their large numbers in relation to the rest of the missions and their ability to operate on smaller subsidies than the Protestants all combined to their benefit and they withstood the pressures aimed at driving them out. Economy, continuity, and the avoidance of unpleasantness won out over expensive, better quality government schools with professional secular staff.

     By 1945 the system was in sorry condition. Many of the Italians remained interned in England although some were now returning. The mission community was short on staff, materials for implementing Cox's reforms had been taken for war use, buildings had fallen into disrepair while under military requisition; in sum, all the progress promised by the new government initiatives of 1938 had failed as a result of the war and its demands. [46] Trying to pull itself together, the government began to act on the seven year old contents of the Cox reforms and introduced new pay scales which now covered seventy-five percent of the salaries being paid to the trained educationists. It also actively pressed for the priority transport of all interned Roman Catholics from England back to the Sudan and was obviously trying to get the system back into efficient operation. [47]

     At the end of World War II the mission-Government relation-

ship was still adversely affected by several unreconciled difficulties. The Inspectorate and the administration in the South had been stripped during the war and were not back to strength. The Verona Fathers were either interned in England or under suspicion in the South; those still involved in the schools were often feuding with the Mill Fathers. The professional skills of those involved in teaching remained deficient. Until the end of the era of Southern Policy, teacher qualification remained an unsolved problem. The Education Report for 1945 states:

The lack of trained teachers indeed is the chief obstacle to big strides in education and it is therefore significant that the new proposals for development are concerned particularly with the proper training of an adequate number of teachers of all grades from village schoolmasters to teachers in intermediate or junior secondary schools. [48]

     The following comment on the problem of qualifications is somewhat interesting to an American. In 1946 the Governor of Upper Nile Province was approached by the Presbyterians regarding a heretofore unconsidered question:

It was proposed to employ negroes for missionary work in addition to the normal white American personnel of the mission. They would have similar qualifications to those of the latter. Three would be brought in the first instance, probably one educationalist, one doctor and one pastor. After they had had some experience in the field, this team would open up an all-negro station. 1)r. Shields asked if there would be any objection to this proposal. [49]

     Interview responses tend to temper the generally dismal picture of missionary qualifications painted by the official records. Martin Parr felt it was "on the whole, good, all one

could afford at the time." John Hartley, Inspector of Schools, felt that "on the whole the Verona Fathers were making a better job of primary education than was the C.M.S., far better than the Nuba Mountains people (Sudan United Mission)." His colleague, George Janson-Smith, -Inspector and finally Assistant Director of Education-South, saw them in a different light: "Quality was frightful, they were untrained and without money, doing the best they could. Their efforts were misdirected through ignorance." Sir James Robertson had only superficial impressions but they were generally positive: "Some of them (mission schools) were quite good." [50] Evidently, the closer the individual was to the missionaries, the less approving he was. Hartley did not know the Verona Fathers well while Janson-Smith was in close and frequent contact with them. Sir James Robertson had virtually no personal knowledge of any of the missionaries while Hibbert saw all of them on a regular basis.

     As late as 1945 the mission-Government relationship still had its grim moments. An experimental Government Intermediate school was opened in Upper Nile Province but resistance from the C.M.S. was so strong that they refused to send their boys there because they would be exposed to secular learning. The Assistant District Commissioner commented upon the one-way interpretation the C.M.S. was developing In their relationship with the government. He felt that the government supported the missions and deserved support in return when requested. The C.M.S. had arrogated to themselves a

very narrow view of what was owed them and what they owed in return. [51] The mission community and especially the C.M.S. had never accepted fully the subordination of evangelization to education. As long as they were in the Sudan this was the sticking point beyond which it was extremely difficult to improve the relationships. [52] As late as 1950 the mission schools remained an integral part of the southern Sudan's education system. They continued to be the target of Departmental exhortations to upgrade their quality and expand their network and remained a regular feature in the annual planning and budget of the Department of Education. [53]

     The mission-Government relationship throughout the period of the Southern Policy was one of opportunistic self-interest on both sides. The Government hoped to replace northern staff and encourage the development of a non-Muslim identity with a minimum investment in money, materials and manpower. The missions sought a guaranteed field of conversion in the Sphere System and met the educational criteria required for school subsidies while continuing to devote themselves primarily to evangelical work. The Williams Report, the Italian conquest of Abyssinia, and the reforms proposed by Cox stimulated the Government to become more directly involved in the delivery of comprehensive and quality education. The missions did not go through the same clarification of goals. Only after World War II were there substantial efforts made by the missions to develop a professional teaching effort.

     Cox was a landmark in terms of the effect he had on government attitudes; the structural changes proposed in his reforms were delayed by the war. From Cox on though, the direction was.away from a complete reliance on the missions for education. What must now be considered are the consequences of that long-term Government-mission relationship for the process of national integration. After 50 years of first uncontrolled, then barely controlled missionary education in the southern provinces, what were the results?

1. See Chapter III
2. MacMichael papers (Sudan Archive Durham University, England), file 403, box 7.
3. M. A. Rahim, "The Development of British Policy in the Southern Sudan, 1899-1947." (Collection of mimeographed documents presented at the Round Table Conference in Juba, 1965. Copy in Middle East Center, St. Antony's College, Oxford), p. 31.
4. Interviews with: K. D. D. Henderson in his home at Steeple Langford near Salisbury, England on January 13, 1976; Martin Parr in his home at Hammersmith, London, on December 2, 1975, and George Janson-Smith in his home at Bonchurch, Isle of Wight, on January 14, 1976.
5. Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office file 371, vol. 14639, no. 224 of January 27, 1930 (hereafter PRO FO file, vol., number).
6. Southern Policy was discussed on pp. 58-96 of Chapter 111.
7. Khartoum, Central Records Office, Aweil file 1, vol 7, no. 7 of April 1, 1933 (hereafter SGA file, vol, number).
8. Ibid.
9. PRO FO 407, 210, no. 5265 of December 17, 1929.
10. J. S. R. Duncan, The Sudan's Path to Independence (London: William Blackwood and Sons, Ltd., 1957), p. 2.
11. Letter from Martin Parr, Governor of Equatoria Province, to Douglas Newbold, Civil Secretary, March 5, 1942, p. 6 (author's copy)
12. SGA Equatoria 1/4/23 of April 9, 1944.
13. Sir James Robertson, Transition in Africa (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1974), pp. 103-104.
14. PRO FO 407, 210, no. 5265 of December 17, 1929.
15. Native Administration was discussed in Chapter II, pp. 59-60. 197

16. P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1961), pp. 135-136.
17. B. K. Cooke, "Native Administration in Practice: Historical Outline," The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan from Within, ed. J. A. de C. Hamilton London: Faber and Faber, 1935), pp. 191-204.
18. Sir James Currie, paper read at Oxford University, May 3, 1935. (Sudan Archive, Durham University), file 243, box 1, p. 6.
19. SGA Equatoria 1/4/16 of February 9, 1936 (hereafter Williams Report), p. 27.
20. Report by the Governor-General on the Administration, Finances and Conditions of the Sudan for 1937 (Khartoum: McQuorgdale and Co. Ltd., 1937), "Equatoria," p. 21. 4. The Chiefs' Courts were the main organ of Native Administration in the South. (Reported cited hereafter as Governor-General's Report for...)
21. Interviews with Parr and Janson-Smith.
22. SGA Equatoria 1/4/23 of April 9, 1944.
23. Lillian Sanderson, "Educational Development in the Southern Sudan 1900-1948," Sudan Notes and Records, XLIII (1962), pp. 107-108.
24. Annual Report of the Education Department for 1928 (Khartoum: McQuorqdale and Co. Ltd., 1928), p. 50. Hereafter Education Report for...)
25. Ibid., p. 49.
26. Williams Report, p. 1.
27. Education Report for 1946, p. 10.
28. Interviews with Sir Christopher Cox In his lodgings at New College, Oxford, on February 5, 9 and 27, 1976. The point was. stressed several times.
29. A vernacular could be a foreign language. After the Rejaf Conference certain languages were designated "Group Languages" and were the languages of the elementary vernacular schools. A Group Language was the dominant tongue of the particular linguistic family, dialects within a group might be as similar as Portuguese and Spanish or as disparate as Rumanian and French. Thus the comment that the students might be instructed in two foreign languages.

30. SGA Uncatalogued Education Department Files for the Southern Sudan, 1931. (See bibliography for additional information on this category).
31. Education Report for 1932, p. 97.
32. Discussed in Chapter V.
33. M. O. Beshir, Educational Development in the Sudan 1898-1956 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19 9 , p. 124. Also, Williams Report, p. 31.
34. American Mission in the Sudan, Minutes of Annual Meeting for 1936 (microfilm in Archives of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., Philadelphia, 1936), n.p. (hereafter Presbyterian Minutes for...)
35. Williams Report, p. 7.
36. Presbyterian Minutes for 1938, p. 5. Also interview with Christopher Cook in his home at Headington, Oxfordshire, England on January 27, 1976 re. Shaw.
37. Governor-General's Report for 1938, p. 87.
38. SGA Bahr al-Ghazal 1/3/18 of June 1939 and SGA Upper Nile 1/15/127 of June 1939.
39. Presbyterian Minutes for 1938, p. 9.
40. Interviews with Cox and Cook. Also with Sir James Robertson in his home at Cholsey, Berkshire, England, on December 3, 1975. All three discussed the participation of Bishop Gwynne, Anglican Bishop of Egypt and Sudan, in the drafting of reform proposals. The nature of these reforms would have been in line with English practice and it is obvious from the discussion of Fr. Bano's complaint that the C.M.S. stood to benefit the most from them.
41. Letter, Fr. Bano to Sir Christopher Cox, April 17, 1939, Missionari Comboniani Archives, Rome, Sudan Correspondence File.
42. SGA Equatoria 1/4/15 n.d.
43. SGA Equatoria 2/15/58 of July 23, 1940.
44. Secret letter from Martin Parr, Governor of Equatoria, to Douglas Newbold, Civil Secretary, of March 5, 1942. Copy in author's possession.
45. K. D. D. Henderson. The Making of the Modern Sudan (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1953), p. 363.

46. Governor-General's Report for 1945, p. 125.
47. Ibid., p. 126.
48. Education Report for 1945, p. 102.
49. SGA Upper Nile 1/15/127 of February 7, 1946.
50. Interviews with all those named.
51. SGA Upper Nile 1/15/127 of January 7, 1945.
52. L. C. Wilcher, "Problems of Education" (transcript of a speech given at the Institute for Commonwealth Studies, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, Summer 1957), p. 4.
53. Ministry of Education, Proposals for the Expansion and Improvement of the Educational System in the Southern Provinces 1951-1956 (Khartoum: Sudan Government Publication, 1950), p. 7.