The present political boundaries of the Sudan are recent. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the regional insularity of the South was progressively breached, reduced and destroyed by Egyptians, Europeans, Mahdists, and the British. The result was a vast slice of Africa profoundly underdeveloped, shattered by war, and only semi-pacified. The evolution of British government policy as it affected the South must be set in the context of these preconditions which shaped the modern Sudan.

     The first period in this process, the Turkiyya, spans the years 1839-1885 and is dominated by the campaigns of Muhammad Ali and his successors. The modes and reasons for this and the subsequent penetrations of the South by foreigners have been the most important factors shaping the Southern world-view, especially vis-a-vis the North, until the present. During the reign of Muhammad Ali, Egyptian rule had been extended gradually into the middle Nile valley and an administrative center grew up,at Khartoum. In November 1839 a Turkish sailor in Egyptian service managed to penetrate the Sudd, a massive, semipermanent papyrus swamp which had effectively sealed off the South from any contact with the North. The newly opened water route soon became the primary artery of trade and communications between the two regions and remains so until today. [1] By 1841 subsequent expeditions had reached as far as Gondokoro, the Bahr al-Jebel, and Rejaf. In 1846 Pope Gregory XVl created the Vicariate Apostolic of Central


Africa and soon thereafter the Congregation Propaganda Fide dispatched a small party under the leadership of an Austrian priest, Knoblecher, to Khartoum where they established themselves by 1848. In 185O Knoblecher began to accompany trading expeditions to the South and eventually transferred his headquarters to the rapidly growing commercial and administrative center of Gondokoro. [2] This station was closed in 1854 due to severe attrition from disease and opposition from the local trading community. [3] During these early years the Egyptian government had maintained a monopoly over the Southern trade but this was slowly broken by Egyptian impotence in Muhammad Ali's last years and also diplomatic pressure brought to bear in Cairo and Khartoum from European consuls acting on behalf of a variety of Austrian, Italian, French and British entrepreneurs. The critical commodity was ivory; the price of this article and the amount exported had both doubled in the period 1840-1870. The opening of the White Nile had enabled Europeans to break the Arab monopoly of the ivory trade which had been conducted either via Zanzibar or across the caravan routes of the western Sudan desert.

     As the stocks of ivory diminished in the 1850's, several important developments were set in motion. The foreign traders began to move away from their river bases and set up zeribas in the interior. A zeriba is basically a small fortified trading or military post. The disappearance of easy profits changed the composition of the trading community and by 1863 most Europeans


had evacuated the South leaving it in the hands of Egyptians, Syrians, and Northern Sudanese; all collectively known to the Southerner as Turks. In some cases these were agents of Europeans but more often they were independent traders. The zeriba system demanded sizable staff in order to maintain security in what had become hostile territory and also to convey the ivory from zeriba to river transshipment points. This resulted in growing foreign domination and organization of the slave trade. [4] Racial superiority was assumed by Europeans over Blacks, cultural superiority was assumed by Muslims over Pagans: the term abeed (slave) became a common epithet to describe any Southerner. [5] Slavery was not new to the South. It had been a feature of intertribal warfare for decades before the advent of outsiders. In the Upper Nile the ivory and slave trade continued to be dominated by Turks. To the west, in Bahr al-Ghazal, the dominant commercial presence were the jellaba, small-scale merchants mainly from the Northern Sudan. Before the mid-185O's, slavery comprised a tiny aspect of the commercial exploitation of the South. [6] Based on an analysis of diaries kept by Roman Catholic missionaries and those of European traders and mercantile agents operating in the South during this early period, slavery was simply one aspect of the broadening front of Northern penetration. The slave trade, however, does not appear to have been one of the primary difficulties which embittered the relationship between the southerners and the outside world in the early years. It was only later that its direct influence was heavily felt in the southern Sudan, and even then in a large part of the area It remained merely a facet of the ivory trade. [7]


     The decision of the traders to leave the river and move into the interior resulted in a permanent condition of destructive violence. The simmering feuds among the various tribes were now constantly to boil up in warfare. The further they were drawn into the interior in search of ivory the larger their requirements for troops and porters became, leading to more emphasis on slavery.

     By the middle 1860's the tribal structure in both the upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal had been seriously weakened. This was accompanied by widespread violence, cruelty, and murder. It is incorrect to assign responsibility to the foreigners, particularly the Europeans, for this degeneration of conditions in the South. The cruelty and violence associated with the commercial opening up of the southern Sudan appears to have been a characteristic of the region even before its subjection.

He (the foreigner) simply stimulated the existing tribal rivalries and stabilized their shifting antagonisms by forming alliances with certain tribal sections .... The chaos of tribal warfare, which previously had appeared as an obstacle to any penetration and expansion, was exploited and transformed into the means of extending his (the foreign trader) power over a vast region. A firm pattern of alliances, subjection and hostility was established. [8]

     Thus the brutality and warfare which pre-existed the penetration of the South was manipulated by foreign traders for their own ends. They did not introduce these problems into the region.

     As beads and other cheap trade goods lost their value, the medium of exchange both between Southerners and foreigners and among foreigners became either slaves or cattle. The raiding for


these two items therefore continued to spread and became common throughout the region. By the early 1860's even Said, the Egyptian Khedive, was ordering up five hundred negroes to serve as his personal bodyguard. [9] This quasi-official sanction encouraged the continuation and expansion of the commerce.

     With the zeriba as a secure base, the jellaba commercial exploitation flourished. At the beginning of Ismail's reign, only the Azande tribe remained outside this web of destructive commerce. [1O] The penetration by jellaba of the South brought them into contact with the most intimate levels of southern society. This was commercially profitable but also made the jellaba the most visible agents of the system of subjection and exploitation. They paid for this with their lives during the Mahdiyya and with their exclusion and suspicion during the Condominium. This Egyptian-dominated phase of the Turkiyya came to an end with the discovery of the source of the Nile by Speke and Grant and the reign of the ambitious and Western-oriented Khedive Ismail.

     The European explorations of the Nile-Congo divide increased the interest felt by the Khedive for territorial and commercial expansion. The Egyptian ruler realized that the entire equatorial region could be opened up and its riches exploited. The knowledge of the large population and potential natural riches encouraged the extension of Egypt's Sudanese empire toward the Equator. The Khedive's governmental monopoly of trade and discriminatory customs and tariff scheme hastened the retreat of the few remaining European traders from the South and by 1866 they were completely gone.


     Ismail's administration in the Sudan was riddled with corruption. His program of expansion required selfless expertise unavailable through the existing channels of recruitment. Since the direction of expansion was to be to the South, he required incorruptible men who were not a part of the network of vested interests involved in commerce in the South."

     At the local level of government in the South the lines of division between jellaba and Khedival officials were often blurred to invisibility. The Khedive relied on Europeans; soldiers of fortune, adventurers and explorers, to lead his imperial thrust. The letters, newspaper articles, and speeches of these men had the effect of introducing the southern Sudan to a large European audience whose appetites had been whetted by the travel accounts written by Burton and Speke. [12]

     One of the Khedive's first employees, Sir Samuel Baker, was extensively covered by the popular, especially the British, press while on campaign in the equatorial regions. [13] This coverage of Baker's exploits was the first information that many liberal Europeans had of the exotic and apparently barbaric conditions then existing in the southern Sudan. Uppermost in the minds of many of these readers was a growing concern with and repugnance for the practice of slavery. [14] Baker's attempts from 1869-1873 to carry out the Khedive's orders and root out the institution of slavery and develop the economic potential of the South failed completely. About the only noteworthy results of his frustrating campaigns were the enhanced credibility of Egypt's claim to what was now known as Equatoria or Equatorial Province, the elimination of conflict between lesser autonomous traders who were driven out, and an oversimplification and exaggeration of the impact


slavery was having on the internal conditions among the various tribes. Baker arrived in an area which had been ruthlessly exploited and constantly subjected to bitter and violent raiding and warfare by foreign traders for their own ends. His discerned the existence of slavery within this chaos and jumped to a faulty conclusion: the mess had been the direct result of slavery. Baker reviled slavery as the original and root cause of all the destruction he witnessed when, in fact, at that time, it seems to have been a minor and recent development. [15] That Baker chose to define his mission as primarily one of suppression of slavery is curious since it seems the Khedive had appointed him to conduct a campaign of annexation deep into the equatorial reaches of the Nile Basin, consolidating as he went by.establishing fortified garrisons along the way. Suppression of slavery was an aspect of the Khedive's charge to Baker but not the entire nor even the most important part of the charge. [16]

     Baker's tour was followed by Gordon who governed Equatoria from 1873 to 1876. He generally improved the Egyptian situation by rigorous enforcement of high standards of administrative efficiency; he also began to organize a legitimate system of commerce based on the animal and mineral products of the region and was well on the way toward making Equatoria an asset rather than a liability to the Egyptian treasury. Ismail was probably expecting too large a return on his limited investment and did not provide Gordon with sufficient military power to conquer and effectively control the less accessible fringes. His local officials sometimes solved the manpower problem


as their trading predecessors had, by either purchasing or raiding for slaves. [17]

     Gordon's departure was followed by a stow slide back into anarchy as the Khedive's interests were drawn to matters closer to home in the 1870-1880 period. The outposts of government authority degenerated into the zeriba system of raiding and banditry which had by now become familiar to the extremely hostile, proud, and xenophobic southern Sudanese. These last years of the Turkiyya saw the appointment of capable Europeans such as the Italian Gessi, the Silesian Schnitzer or Emin Pasha, and the British Lupton. These men were saddled with an inept and corrupt Egyptian administration, many of them Dongolawi from northern Sudan, and hobbled by the inability to communicate with Khartoum and the lack of concern or support from Cairo.

     As Egypt's grip slackened, the Sudan entered a new phase of its history. By the late 1870's the South was torn by a three-sided struggle: a few conscientious Egyptian soldier-administrators trying to control both the slaver-trader renegades and the constantly rising tribes. The terminal years of the Turkiyya degenerated into chaos in the South.

     The Mahdl and his movement falls outside the framework of this work. What does concern us here is the impact of the Mahdiyya on conditions in the South. Bahr al-Ghazal was the first Southern province Invaded by Mahdists. In 1881 agents began inciting the negroid tribes in the northern region of the province to revolt against Egyptian oppression. Many of these tribes had ties of


affinity with the Arab tribes of Kordofan and Darfur and therefore tended to identify with the Mahdist cause. The Nilotic Nuer, Dinka, and Shiliuk, further removed from Arab contacts, joined simply to gain an ally in their fight against foreign rule; any foreign rule. There was also a large community of northern Sudanese in the province, mainly traders and tower-level administrative per sonnet. These, too, came out for the Mahdi, seeing the overthrow of the Egyptians as an opportunity to resume slaving without interference. [18]

     Thus, we find two groups with mutually irreconcilable intentions under the Mahdist banner to expel the Egyptians. By the end of 1881 the government was faced with widespread armed revolt. The situation remained fluid for the next two or three years, although in 1883 there were serious Dinka uprisings. The Dinka rose on their own behalf. They never accepted Mahdism and any alliance enacted between the two was seen by the Dinka as temporary and pragmatic. By mid-1883 the Dinka were joined by revolting Shiliuk and Nuer tribes and "Lupton's (the Egyptian governor) position in the summer of 1883 was becoming more and more precarious." By 1884 battles pitting 1000-2000 government troops against up to 50,000 Nilotes were a frequent occurrence. [19]

     The destruction of Hicks Pasha's entire force at the Battle of Shaykan doomed the Egyptian regime in Bahr al-Ghazal since the Mahdi was now able to send 5,000 veteran Ansar (Mahdist troops) into the province without fear of government resistance from outside. Lupton tried to withdraw and consolidate his forces but widespread desertion


to the Mahdists left him with only 1200 troops and they refused to fight. Bahr al-Ghazal was surrendered on April 20, 1884. [20]

     Equatoria Province was next. In July of 1883 the Dinka had begun the campaign by revolting against Emin Pasha, the Egyptian Governor. The news of the fall of the West, capture of Slatin, destruction of Hicks, and surrender of Bahr al-Ghazal, all had the obvious effect of destroying Egyptian morale and disrupting what remained of Emin's authority.

     The Equatoria garrisons were well-manned with experienced Egyptian military cadres leading Jihadiyya troops armed with modern Remington repeating rifles and secure in strong fortifications. [21] The apparently hopeless situation facing Equatoria caused the Dongolawi civil servants to go over to the Mahdist side but the troops remained loyal. The Invasion of Equatoria was delayed several months by a revolt of Jihadiyya troops in Bahr al-Ghazal along the Wau-Rumbek road.

     This was the first of a number of black mutinies against the Mahdists and was the result of growing hostility Irritated by the blacks being treated as staves. The feeling that something more should have been the reward for their having joined the Mahdists in expelling the Egyptians ran head on into northern Sudanese racism. [22]

     As a consequence, Equatoria saw no Mahdists troops until January of 1885. [23] After the fall of Khartoum, January 25, 1885, Emin withdrew to the south of Equatoria since he could no longer hope to link up with relieving forces coming up the Nile from the capital. Once again


he was spared the impending confrontation with the invading Ansar by another Jihadiyya revolt in Bahr al-Ghazal. By mid-1885 a chain of Egyptian garrisons secured about 180 miles of river from Lake Albert to Lado. The loyalty of the Egyptian and Jihadiyya troops in these stations held for they were defending the Khedive who was their only hope of rescue, and their homes. [24]

     The death of the Mahdi in 1885 proved a further respite. The Khatifa, successor to the Mahdi, was forced to strip Bahr al-Ghazal of all its troops in order to quell a rebellion and challenge to his succession from dissidents in Darfur. Within a few months the entire province had returned to the anarchic situation which had prevailed before the Turkiyya. The Khalifa made no serious attempt to re-establish control during his regime. [25]

     News of Stanley's expedition to relieve Emin from the south caused the Khalifa to order another invasion of Equatoria in 1888. This was apparently a political decision aimed at removing the European-Egyptian threat and not a Jihad to extend Mahdism. [26]

     Troop shortages and regional instability led the Khatifa to forbid the slave trade except for enlarging the Jihadiyya troops who were becoming the mainstay of Mahdist forces. Forbidding slavery as a general practice would remove a source of tribal hostility and also prevent the establishment of private armies which might be used against either government. Conditions in Equatoria began to deteriorate in 1888-1889. Rejaf fell to the Mahdists In October of 1888 and by 1889 Emin was faced with mutiny and even threats to his personal


safety by his Jihadiyya who suspected the Stanley relief expedition would evacuate Emin and the Egyptian military cadres to Cairo leaving the Southerners leaderless against the Mahdist Invasion. Many of the mutineers were destroyed in an abortive attack to recover Rejaf in late 1888, the rest either took to the hills or agreed to accompany Emin and the Egyptians as they retreated toward Zanzibar. [27]

     Equatoria now began to dissolve into anarchy as had Bahr al Ghazal. The main Mahdist garrison in Rejaf found itself in the midst of a congeries of private slave armies led by mutineers, deserters, renegade Turks and ex-Jihadiyya. All of them were heavily engaged in the ivory trade, extensive slave-raiding, and picking off small detachments of Mahdists whenever they were caught unaware. It was at this point that the Mahdists began to give full vent to their contempt for the black Southerner. Convinced that they had been created by God as slaves with no redeeming qualities, the Mahdist forces began to act on those convictions. The words "slave" and "negro" have been interchangeable in the Arabic language for centuries; the general Arab treatment of the Negroids in Equatoria appears to bear out this relationship, which still exists and is the most unfortunate legacy of the Mahdiyya in the Southern Sudan. [28]

     As long as both the Ansar and the tribes had the Egyptians as a common enemy their relations were fairly satisfactory. After the evacuation of Emin and the breakup of his forces "the contempt of the Ansar for the Negroid helped to produce the fighting which soon broke out when the Mahdists attempted to impose their rule


and religion on the tribes." [29] To the tribes the Egyptians' absence meant they could resume their traditional autonomy. To the Mahdists it was the acquisition of unchallenged control over a new piece of the Dar ul-Harb (House of War, a non-Muslim region) to be converted, by Jihad if necessary. This, of course, turned the tribal hostilities on the Mahdists who were having difficulty maintaining any power in the province. In 1888-1890 all attempts to disarm and convert the tribes were viciously rebuffed. A slow, deadly and grinding campaign of destruction and conquest began to eat up the tribes whose hatred and resentment continued to grow. [30]

     In the period 1889-1892 a combination of attacks by deserters from Emin's forces and widespread tribal revolts caused the Mahdist forces to go on the defensive. [31] They were losing control of the province. This became even further complicated by the entry of Belgian-led Congolese troops who began to move down the White Nile in 1890 to link up with the deserters who had refused to leave with Emin. This Belgian-Equatorial alliance developed sporadically from 1890-1893 and fell apart in 1894 with the Belgians withdrawing back across the Nile-Congo divide under Mahdist pressure. [32] The pressure was so great that Mahdist forces made deep penetration into the Free State in 1894. [33] In the same year the remaining Equatorial deserters were virtually annihilated by the Mahdists and a general offensive seemed to be developing. [34] But by this time the "Scramble for Africa" had begun to work its effect on events in the southern Sudan.


     The British ceded the Lado Enclave to King Leopold and the resulting Belgian buildup led to an offensive against the Mahdists at the end of 1894. By February 1895 the Belgian advance on Bahr al-Ghazal was unopposed by the Mahdists but constantly held up by tribal ambushes. Kitchener's victory over the Mahdists in the north at Farka in June 1896 caused an apprehensive Belgian Government to order the occupation of the entire Enclave to establish the validity of their claim there. [35] Khartoum tried to reinforce Rejaf, Mahdist headquarters in Equatoria, but the troops were stranded for months in the Sudd and emerged decimated by disease in early 1896. The Rejaf commander was forced to strip the province to meet the growing Belgian threat. By late 1896 Rejaf was on its last legs. Menaced by the Belgians, cut off by the Sudd, sniped at and constantly ambushed by the tribes, ammunition so low each rifleman had been issued a supplementary spear, the Mahdist forces now numbered no more than 1,000 effectives. In February 1897 Rejaf fell to the Belgians. [36]

     From 1885 to 1895 Bahr al-Ghazal had been free of external influence and tribal relations had reverted to their pre-Egyptian character. This was disrupted by the arrival of the Belgians in 1894 and the French in 1895. Mahdist responses to these events consisted of a few raids into the province for slaves to serve as troops in combatting this new European threat. In 1894 the bulk of Mahdist forces moving to intercept the Belgians was annihilated in a Dinka ambush. [37] The Franco-Congolese Treaty of 1894 resulted in the withdrawal of all Belgian forces by February 1895. The few remaining


Mahdists quit the province, driven by disease and famine and called to quell yet another revolt in Darfur. The French did not succeed in introducing any number of troops into the province before Fashoda crushed their hopes. Thus, Bahr al-Ghazal once again reverted to tribal raids and warfare by 1895. [38]

     The Mahdist invasions of the two provinces of southern Sudan are best described as extended raids "which upset the traditional pattern of tribal life and left nothing behind but anarchy and fear." [39] They had been strong enough to destroy but too weak to rule.

     Thus in the fifty years from 1860 to 1910, the inhabitants of the Upper Nile Valley took an unwilling and always painful part in the making of more history than they had experienced in the last 5000. Small wonder if they conceived an apprehension of foreign intruders and a conviction of their impermanence. [40] The arriving British soldiers, Egyptian administrators, and Christian missionaries who began the restoration of the South found a ruined and broken country. During the Mahdist era, all the Christian missionaries had been killed, captured, or driven out and hardly any trace of their work remained. The surviving tribes were suspicious and hostile and it took all of the next thirty years to pacify them; the Nuer being the last to succumb. A bewildering variety of social organizations, dialects, and ethnic groupings compounded the problems of government.

     Eight or nine tongues are spoken in the southern part of Fung Province; a dozen are current in Mongalla. There are probably a hundred languages


     and dialects spoken in the Sudan today. Customs, beliefs, material culture, vary from tribe to tribe. Some can scarcely ever eat meat; for others the normal diet is a mixture of blood and milk. The Zande a generation ago were practising cannibalism. There is the widest range of temperament, from the somewhat sullen aloofness of the Latuka and Shilluk to the vivacious imitativeness of the Acholi. The Dinka seems to have a particular capacity for nursing a grievance. [41]

     With pressing practical tasks demanding their constant attention, the Condominium Government gave permission to the Christian missions to engage in education and some medical work. In isolated areas, often inaccessible to the overworked political staff, the missionaries, especially the Roman Catholics, became a law unto themselves. Throughout these early years, one reads frequent complaints from District Commissioners of beatings of students, obstruction of government officials in performance of their duty, and conspiracy to circumvent government regulations, all against the early Roman Catholic missionaries. [42]

     The tribal composition remained complex during the early years. In 1928 the problem of what languages to employ in the schools brought about the Rejaf Language Conference. The following list illustrates the problems they dealt with. The Dinka spoke eight dialects, the Nuer, two; the Shilluk, twelve; the Bari, five; the Latuka, four; the Zande, six; two others, Acholi and Madi, were mainly outside the Sudan and were not considered.43 The tribes remained hostile Into the 1930's and the entire attention of the British remained concentrated on peace, order, economy, and keeping an eye on the French and the Belgians. [44]


The Southern Sudan was organized into three large provinces: Mongalla, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile. In 1934 the first two were combined as Equatoria and in 1947 this was split into Equatoria and Bahr al-Ghazal. The area comprises some 240,000 square miles and was inhabited by somewhere between 1.5 and 3 million people.

     The Provinces were ruled by a Governor. In the first thirty years after the Reconquest, the governors were soldiers usually on extended secondment from the Egyptian Army. After 1930 these "Bog Barons," as they were known, were replaced by career members of the Sudan Political Service recruited annually in small numbers mainly from Oxford and Cambridge. The Province Headquarters were Wau for Bahr-al-Ghazal, Juba for Mongalla, and Malakal for Upper Nile. Juba became the headquarters for Equatoria after the amalgamation of Mongalla and Bahr al-Ghazal. Each province was subdivided into Districts under the charge of a Commissioner (D.C.). [45] In the period before 1924 the District Commissioner was more usually an Egyptian officer known as Mamur. Gradually an intervening British rank was introduced and subsequently formalized as D.C. The Mamurs and D.C.'s were also usually soldiers. [46

     These] political officers numbered less than fifty and were spread amongst twenty stations. Supporting them were detachments of the Sudan Defense Force, Egyptian Irrigation Service personnel and a dozen Medical Officers. [47] After 1926 a Resident Inspector of Education (South) was added to the region. The total non-Sudanese establishment numbered Just over one hundred. They shared the South with less


than three hundred missionaries, most of them Italian Roman Catholics.

     The exclusion of Egyptians from higher cadres in the government had long irritated the junior co-dominus. In Allenby's declaration of February 28, 1922, recognizing Egypt's independence, the Sudan was "absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government." [48] This situation was seen as threatening to Egypt's long-standing claims to the Sudan and also to its dependence on those who controlled the Nile Waters. The British attitude had evolved into a sincere commitment of trusteeship to the Sudanese complicated by growing suspicion of the aims of Egyptian nationalism. [49 Both] were seeking a fundamental revision of the governance of the Condominium for completely different reasons. There had developed a pro-Egyptian contingent in the North, centered in the towns and comprised mainly of western-educated middle-class minor civil servants and non-commissioned officers in the Sudan Defense Force. The British tended to overlook this growing modern sector and favored the maintenance of patronizing relations with the tribal elites of notables, religious leaders, and chiefs. Their distaste for the "Effendiyya" occur frequently in their documents. [50]

     Agitation from Egypt led to the formation of the White Flag League, an organization of Sudanese nationalists under the influence of the nationalist movement in Egypt. Sudanese nationalists at this time were almost exclusively members of the "Effendiyya" but their militant leadership was drawn from the Military School in Khartoum. British policy had been to recruit 'southerners, especially


the Dinka, for career posts in the Sudan Defense Force and in 1924 Ali Abd al-Latif, an ex-officer and a Dinka, led the League in a series of demonstrations in Khartoum and Umdurman. The arrest of the leader did not halt these activities and by November of that year armed demonstrations and small-scale mutinies had broken out. [51] The loyalty of Sudanese and Egyptian troops in the Sudan began to worry both the Governor-General, Sir Lee Stack and Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt. Stack was assassinated in Cairo on November 19, 1924, and this precipitated a crisis. Allenby demanded the withdrawal of all Egyptian officers and Egyptian Army units from the Sudan within 24 hours. For the next few days it was not clear whether this would be accomplished, but, with minor incidents, the Allenby demands were met and Sudan was effectively purged of all Egyptian military cadres. The most dramatic expression of Sudanese nationalism during this period was the mutiny of the Eleventh Sudanese which was only suppressed by British artillery units who destroyed the entire Battalion and the hospital wherein they had barricaded themselves. [52]

     The evacuation of Egyptian troops preceded the dismissal of all Egyptian civilian officials from the government except for a few members of the Irrigation Service, thus producing a de facto end to the Condominium. These seminal events had an important effect on the evolution of government policy in the South. The British had already initiated steps designed to reduce contacts between the southern Sudan and the remainder of the Condominium.


     In 1922 a Passports and Permits Ordinance had been enacted which gave the Governor-General or his designated representative the power to "close" a district. Districts could be "absolutely closed" or simply "closed." in the first case, no Sudanese or foreign national could enter the district; in the latter entry was only permitted subject to conditions and for purposes specified by the Governor General. Entry permits were required which could be refused without reason and cancelled without notice. Nonrenewal or cancellation obliged the affected person to close out his affairs and depart the district, possibly forfeiting his surety deposit of 50 Sudanese pounds as well. [53]

     After the White Flag League disturbances and the expulsion of Egyptian officials, the Sudan Government declared all three provinces in the South "closed" due to their growing suspicion of Northern Sudanese sympathy for anti-British Egyptian nationalism. The fear was that the naive and simple Southerner would be no match for the northerner who supposedly still saw the southerner as beneath him and fair game for economic and political exploitation. Slowly the number of northerners resident in the South was reduced by the exercise of this Ordinance.

     This de facto separation was complemented by increasing the emphasis on devolution through the policy of "Indirect Rule" or, as it was known in the Sudan, Native Administration. [54] The British were concerned that too much influence could be concentrated in the hands of the few northerners who traded, served the government, and lived in the South. In both the North and South the British adopted


policies aimed at excluding this non-traditional elite from any access to power.

     In the North the policy was an unstated but systematic exclusion of the Effendiyya, in the South, it was aimed at the jellaba and their imitators. The government adopted a distinctly rural and conservative bias toward shoring up or in many cases recreating traditional tribal patterns of authority. The Power of Shaykhs Ordinanace of 1927 was followed by the Chief's Court Ordinance of 1931 and the Native Courts Ordinance of 1932, all designed to either recognize or create native governing bodies to lighten the load on the British and diminish the influence of the Effendiyya and jellaba. [55] The educated Egyptian or northern Sudanese serving in the South was being replaced. Some of these functions, i.e., petty justice and tax-collection, were being assumed by Chief's Courts staffed by tribal leaders and notables. Administrative tasks were being slowly taken up by clerks and medical assistants who were being trained for government service by the mission schools. The rejection of any northern presence in the South, and the expulsion of the Egyptians increased the requirement for locally-trained staff and, in 1927 the Non-Government Schools Ordinance was enacted to give the British some control or at least influence over the education of their clerical and administrative personnel. [56] (This Ordinance is discussed in detail in Chapter Four).

     Thus, as a result of the British reaction to the upheavals of Egyptian nationalism complemented by the White Flag League disturbances and capped by Stack's assassination, the beginnings of a


distinctly separate approach to the administration of the Southern Sudan emerged. From 1924 until 1946 the South was essentially a huge Closed District, increasingly reserved to the indigenous community and insulated from the world around it. This community was overseen by a tiny group of British bureaucrats assisted by what few trained Southerners there were to be found.


1. Richard Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 1-16. 2. Ibid., pp. 23-26.
3. P. M. Holt, A Modern History of the Sudan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 19 I , p. 60.
4. Gray, Southern Sudan, pp. 32-35.
5. Ibid., p. 36.
6. Taj Hargey, D. Phil. candidate at St. Antony's College, Oxford, discussed his research in the history of slavery in the Sudan with me on several occasions while engaged in research in the Central Records Office, Khartoum, during March-April 1976.
7. Gray, Southern Sudan, p. 46.
8. Ibid., pp. 47-48.
9. Ibid., p. 52.
1O. Jellaba were small-time itinerant or locally-based merchants. They were originally either Northern Sudanese, Copts, or Syrians, later, almost always Northern Sudanese. The Jalabiyya Sudanese national dress,was a distinguishing article of clothing, especially since the Southerner went nude, thus those who came from the North and wore the Jalabiyya became Jellaba.
11. Holt, A Modern History, p. 67.
12. The Burton-Speke travels lasted from 1854-1859 and resulted in several articles by Speke in Blackwoods Magazine in 1859 and the publication of Sir Richard Burton's Lake Regions of Central Africa (London: Longmans, Green, Ltd., 1860) and The Nile Basin (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1864). See biographical appendix for personal data on Burton and Speke.
13. See biographical appendix for Baker.
14. Gray, Southern Sudan, pp. 82-83.
15. Baker's picturesque and flawed impressions of conditions in Equatoria during his tenure there are found in: Sir Samuel Baker, Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, 2 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1874). The critique of his emphasis on the destruction brought about by slavery is in Gray, Southern Sudan, pp. 96-99.




16">16. Holt, A Modern History, pp. 67-68.


17. Gray, Southern Sudan, pp. 108-111.
18. Robert O. Collins, The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898. A Struggle for Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, I962), pp. 22-23.
19. Ibid., pp- 34-38.
20. Ibid., p. 41.
21. Ibid., p. 41.
22. The Jihadiyya were Southern Sudanese troops usually well-trained, reliable, and loyal. They worked out better in the Sudan than they had for the Khedive in Egypt. During the Mahdiyya, both sides employed Jihadiyya.
23. Collins, A Struggle for Control, pp. 44-47.
24. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
, p. 56.
27. lbid., pp. 6I-69.
28. Ibid., p. 72.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
, P. 78.
31. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
32. Ibid., pp. 92-I09.
33. Ibid., p. 110.
34. Ibid., pp. 115-116.
35. Ibid., pp. 130-132.
36. Ibid., pp. I33-136 and I64.
37. Ibid., p. 140.
38. Ibid., p. 155.


39. Ibid., p. 177.
40. L. F. Nalder, "The Two Sudans: Some Aspects of the South," in The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium from Within, ed. by J. A. de C. Hamilton (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1935), p. 100.
41. Ibid., p. 103.
42. Khartoum, Central Records Office, "Bahr al-Ghazal," file 1, Vol. 4, no. 24 of 1919-1933 (hereafter SGA file. vol. no.)
43. Sudan Government, Report of the Rejaf Language Conference (London: McQuorqdale and Co., Ltd., 1928), p. 30 and appendices.
44. Sudan Government, Report by the Governor-General on the Administration Finances and Conditions of the Sudan 1932, (Khartoum: McQuorqdale and Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 21. hereafter Governor General's Report for ); also R. Collins and R. Herzog, "Early British Administration in the Southern Sudan," in Journal of African History, II (1961), pp. 127-132.
45. Great Britain. Public Record Office. Foreign Office, Confidential Print, File 407, vol. 217, no. 5372, July 3, 1934. (Hereafter PRO, file (F.O.371 for Egypt and Sudan or F.O. 407 for Confidential Print), vol, and no.).
46. Holt, A Modern History, p. 119.
47. PRO, F.O. 407, 217, no. 5372.
48. Holt, A Modern History, p. 127. From the Reconquest in 1898 until the crisis of 1924 precipitated by the murder of Sir Lee Stack, Governor-General of the Sudan, while visiting Cairo, the Egyptian status as a partner in the Condomium had been dictated by the British. The Egyptians were denied high office, were always subordinate to the British, and enjoyed little, if any, respect from their co-dominus. The Condominium had never been more than a fiction invented by the British to avoid bringing the question of the Sudan before the Congress of Europe after the destruction of the Mahdist regime.
49. This point was given special emphasis during the interviews with Martin Parr, Richard Owen, and Sir James Robertson. The impression is strengthened by Holt's discussion of the events of 1922 1924 in his A Modern History, pp. 127-134.
50. "Effendiyya": from Effendi, loosely "sir," used with pejorative overtones by the British to denote town and Khartoum Arabs who were "putting on airs" of modern European style, thought, education, etc. MacMichael often used the term "Black Englishmen" in the same spirit.


51. Holt, A Modern History, pp. 130-131 and M. O. Beshir, The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict (London: C. Hurst and Co., 1968), p. 40.
52. Holt, loc. cit.
53. Muddathir Abd al-Rahim, "Fourteen Documents on the Problem of the Southern Sudan," New York (U.N. Headquarters), 1965, p. 5 (mimeographed).
54. Indirect Rule was the principle of British Colonial government under Lord Lugard in Nigeria in the early twentieth century. The idea of ruling natives with natives was very appealing to the British and almost every one of their African possessions had some form of this rule. See Ga'afar M. A. Bakheit, "Native Administration in the Sudan and its Significance to Africa," in Sudan in Africa, ed. by Yusuf Fad] Hasan (Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1971), pp.256-278.
55. Bakheit, "Native Administration," p. 259.
56. Holt, A Modern History, p. 136 and Rah'iin, "Fourteen Documents," p. 9.