1. Selection of a governance system accompanies the identity creation.
2. The new governance system may have been one that was modified from an existing one, with significant changes.
3. The new governance system may also be borrowed in its entirety from another polity.
4. Occasionally, an attempt is made to synthesize a new governance system. This is done by taking parts from several different systems, extant or extinct.
5. Every so often, a new system is designed anew by a polity. That new system becomes a new marker in the general spectrum of political systems.
6. Success of the new governance system will depend on its acceptance by the polity.
7. To ensure the successes of the new governance system, the designer community (which works for the governance strata; may even include their kin and kith in their ranks), working in conjunction with the governance strata, will have to embark upon a "selling" campaign.
8. The designer community of the new governance system will also concern themselves with the methods of preserving it.
9. Hence, there will emerge a system of inducements and compulsion, to have the new governance system take root. 10. Individuals constituting a polity will harbor personal preferences as part of their identity.
11. Preferences of individuals within a polity may be self defined or influenced or planted in their minds by others.
12. Individuals of similar and shared goals, to varying degrees, will form sub-groups or parties in order to preserve or advance those goals.
13. Sub-groupings are formed within a polity, regardless of the prevailing governance system.
14. The formal designation of such sub-groupings need not be political parties.
15. Various governance participation units will be formed by polity members to reap the benefits that will accrue from such association.
16. When the governance system of a polity does not allow real participation in the governance of the polity by individuals, opposition sub-groups will emerge.
17. Opposition groups within a polity that does not allow open participation in the governance of the polity will take distinct forms, either underground or camouflaged within existing institutional cover.
18. Those individuals associating for the purpose of forming a governance participation unit may also belong to other organizations within the same polity.
19. Each of these organizations may be at first be construed as an underground opposition group operating within an established formal institution.
20. Such an organization may be quickly discovered within a tightly controlled polity.
21. Upon discovery of the underground organization, the fortunes of its members will depend on the attitude of the leadership of the formally existing institution.
22. If the leadership of the formally existing institution providing unwitting cover for the undercover organization is unhappy with the policies of the governance system of the polity, they may decide to co-opt the underground organization.
23. At that point, the involved formally existing institution and the larger polity will begin to redefine a new set of identities.
24. A polity will possess a set of founding rules called laws, constituting the bases of its governance, outlining its self-defined identity.
25. In most cases, the founding rules of a polity will be written, though not all present-day constitutions are.
26. Not all polities constitute their founding rules with an eye to establishing and maintaining checks and balances among the institutions specified therein for the governance of the polity.
27. The lack of clear checks and balances in a set of founding rules does not prevent such relationships from developing.
28. Extant formal organizations within the polity will vie for primacy.
29. The competition for primacy among extant formal organizations emerges from self-interest, to preserve their identities, or to prevent others from attempting to change the said identity.
30. The competition for primacy will take various forms. In the end, to preserve themselves and their identities, all organizations will need variegated resources.
31. Extant governance systems will not allow the formation of new official sub-groupings within their polities, even if they are expressly constituted to participate in the governance of that polity, as components of the ruling governance system.
32. The extant formal organizations are exempt from any ban on the formation of new sub-groupings or governance participation units, should they decide to change camps within the formal governance system's internal balance of power formula, and representing accepted wings or 'parties.'
33. The prevailing bans on the formation of new governance participation units within a polity will help the extant formal organizations in their quest to remain autonomous.
34. The existence of a written constitution does not guarantee that its tenets will be observed, or applied uniformly, or applied at all.
35. Governance participation units will be found in every institution and polity, whether or not they are permitted by the governing strata.
36. Governance participation units do not stop at the borders of a polity.
37. Governance participation units of diverse polities may decide to cooperate across borders.
38. Cross border cooperation of governance participation units are aimed at reaching their general goal.
39. Cooperation across the borders of polities is not confined to governance participation units.
40. More significantly, Thought Employers will engage in exchange of ideas across borders of polities.
41. New ideas will enter into the vocabulary of the polity members at large.
42. Use of new vocabulary, borrowed from another language or not, will involve the expectations associated with and instigated by new ideas.
43. If a polity has a policy of closed or tightly controlled borders, it will experience significant difficulties in preventing ideas from entering the polity. If at all.
44. Identities develop to recognizable levels due to contact of one polity with others; usually neighbors or trading partners.
45. It is the Thought Employers that will engage in the accelerated development of the natural identity.
46. Consciously thinking strata consist of Thought Employers; not those individuals or collectives who have to engage their brains for daily functions, but whose thoughts employ the resources of others.
47. The greater portion of the mass within a polity will not think of the identity of the polity in a daily interval. Unless, the polity is at war, or under similarly drastic conditions when the identity is at immediate danger.
48. Thought employers will concern themselves, continuously, with the matters pertaining to identity.
49. Thought employers are not always members of the governing strata of a polity.
50. The governing strata of a polity will always be very interested in identity.
51. The governing strata of a polity will work on their own agenda items. However, it is necessary for them to maintain and develop their polity's identity, regardless of all other considerations.
52. In order to maintain and ensure the survival of a polity, it is necessary to answer the question "what are you."
53. The answer to the question "who are you" will reveal multiple identities such as parent, sibling, member of a regional location, or of a profession.
54. The answer to the question "what are you," whether directed at an individual or polity, will require the member of the polity to think beyond, and to reach down to the basic elements that hold that polity together.
55. If the answer to the question "what are you," does not easily roll off the tongues of the members of a polity, there are inherent structural difficulties present.
56. Identity and culture, will be intertwined. This does not mean they are clearly interchangeable. The change in one will affect the other, which in return, will influence the total outcome.
57. Language is one of the primary elements of identity.
58. Literature developed in a given language is but one aspect of that language; not only that the language constitutes a significant portion of the identity of the polity using that language, but also it is a measure of the polity's identity.
59. It must not be forgotten that identity of a polity may be maintained to a large degree in another language as well; provided all other elements of identity have sufficiently deep roots. There are significant examples of this phenomenon.
60. Vocabulary of a language is another index by which to measure the nature of the identity of the polity using that language.
61. Borrowed words, from other languages, is another indicator of the degree which that language and culture is in contact with others.
62. Borrowed vocabulary is also a gauge of the strength and originality of the concerned identity and its related culture.
63. During official identity construction, efforts will be exerted to purify the language from foreign elements, by purging the borrowed words.
64. New terms and vocabulary will be constructed during the officially inspired purification process of a given language, either from earlier forms of the same language, or through neologisms by extending the usages of present words.
65. Identity is a two way street. How a polity regards itself and how others accept (or reject) the identity of that polity is the traffic that flows through that thoroughfare.
66. Other polities might reject the identity of a given polity on the bases that the emerging or reasserted identity will be seen as a disruption of the existing world order.
67. The objectors will contend that demand on already scarce resources would cause a disruption in the supply conditions.
68. The existing alliances within the governance strata of a polity will be forced to reckon with the new balance of power equations developing among a series of relationships as a result of the emergence (or, re-emergence) of a new identity developing in their midst.
69. New identities within balance of power struggles and formulas tend to develop when the top layers of the governance strata remains impassive to perceived changes coming from their own base. All arguments against the assertion or re-assertion of an identity will cause the owners of the same to harden their position.
70. Thus, the rejection of a given polity and its identity by neighbors and others will have repercussions.
71. A polity excluded from the prevailing international order will assert its identity by peaceful or belligerent means.
72. Peaceful assertion of identity will range from placing large advertisements in international publications to world touring cultural events such as art exhibitions (indigenous to that polity) and musical groups to holding international conferences and sporting events on its soil.
73. If these measures seem not to be accepted by the world at large, the rejected polity will resort to belligerency.
74. Belligerent behavior will range from small wars to threat or support of cross-border terrorism.
75. If the polity seeking wider acceptance in the world possesses a former imperial past, the reception of initiatives taken by that polity will be mixed and tied to its imperial history.
76. In response, the governing strata of the ignored polity will choose to resuscitate the past grandeur (perceived or real) of the former empire.
77. Old accounts will be opened, and grievances will be re-visited, with former subjects vehemently opposing the ascendancy of the former imperial polity (their former masters) onto the world stage.
78. The polities that gained independence from the former imperial power will attempt to block the entry of that polity into international cooperation agencies. Failing that, former subjects will do their utmost to impede any decision to be taken in favor of the former imperial power.
79. Thus shunning a polity by attempts to isolate it in a crowd of other polities will only bolster the resolve of its governing strata and the polity in general. This will harden the identity of those shunned, and they will react in a multitudinal prongs.
80. Incidental change of identity due to external contacts will be due to mass media, including motion pictures produced in another polity which will contribute to the nature of the change in identity involved.
81. Mass media products, such as motion pictures, will also affect the identity of all those who are exposed to them.
82. The producers of motion pictures will not necessarily reflect the value systems of their own polity.
83. The motion picture producers usually have their own agendas beyond pecuniary interest.
84. In polities where the governing strata is exerting efforts to create or maintain an official identity will co-opt and tightly control the media, be it oral, print or electronic.
85. In polities where the polity is proud of its asserted or genuinely unique identity, the individuals producing motion pictures will not need any prodding from the governing strata to exalt that identity in their products.
86. All forms of art and creative expression products carry with them the value systems of their creators; doctrinaire or individual.
87. Translated novels, serials and the like will affect the identity of the receiving identity.
88. Consumer goods will have a similar effect on the identities that adopt and use those products.
89. Development of new technologies will have profound influence on the nature and elements of identities anywhere, but not with same measure.
90. An identity producing new technologies will undergo change first. When other polities acquire those technologies, they will begin to fall into the sphere of influence of the polity first developing them.
91. Translated works of thought will invariably have a dual effect on the receiving identity. One group will subscribe to the contents, falling under their spell. Another will react by creating counter arguments, essentially to reinforce their own identity, rejecting the translated/imported thoughts.
92. Identity of Legislative Organs will reflect the identity of the dominant layer of the governance strata.
93. Legislation is directed by the ruling strata of a polity.
94. The more authoritarian the extant governance system in a polity, less it will allow participation in the legislative process.
95. Authoritarian behavior is not limited to those who make governance of a polity their long-term pursuit. Representatives of other professions, given suitable conditions, will step into the role.
96. The members of a legislation will either have a support base of formally recognized and duly constituted institutions of the polity, or groups interested in advancing their causes.
97. Legislators will always be split due to the differences in their support bases.
98. The splits within the legislature will heal only and temporarily when all parties concerned conceive of a mutual threat to themselves, and the polity.
99. Coalitions will be formed within a legislature, when a sub-group fails to secure a majority consensus within a polity.
100. The more authoritarian the governance strata, greater the chances of corruption in the legislative organs due to lack of checks and balances.
101. A doctrinaire approach to governance will yield an authoritarian governance system.
102. A staunchly partisan sub-group with a single agenda-item will exist in every conceivable type of legislature.
103. In polities where the governing strata has absolute or near-absolute control over the affairs of the polity, the legislature will not be more than a rubber-stamp institution.
104. The more open the polity to new ideas and methods, slower the legislature in responding to changing conditions in that polity.
105. The legislature will lag behind the activities and works of the Thought Employers, for the Thought Employers tend to act either alone or in very small independent groups, as they are rarely if ever member of the former.
106. When the polity is dependent on external trade for a large part of its Gross National Product, practitioners from the commercial sector will be more active in the governance and the legislature.
107. The greater reliance of a polity on foreign trade for survival will yield a more active revolving-door effect between the commercial-industrial houses and the governance strata.
108. The more authoritarian a governing strata, the more it shares values with the judicial organs.
109. In authoritarian polities, the judicial organs will be populated by members of the governing strata.
110. When an identity is transformed into an authoritarian one, the pre-existing judiciary will either be replaced by those sympathetic to the new governance strata, or will be forced to side with it.
111. The newly authoritarian identity will undergo deep convulsions.