CHAPTER THREE:
PIPELINE I JAPAN AS A FLEXIBLE LOGISTICAL BASE
The U.S. forces in Japan in 1950 were no longer
an occupational force in the real meaning of the expression, though no peace
treaty had been signed with Japan. Instead this force of more than 100,000
persons of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, was the biggest military
complex the USA had outside its own borders against what they saw as a
communistic threat. What was it that made this Far Eastern force capable of
turning around and fight so well a totally different war compared to what they
had planned for?
Far East Command before the attack
Commander in Chief Far East Command, General
Douglas MacArthur, who personally had received the formal Japanese surrender on
board USS Missouri 2 September 1945, declared the military purposes of the
occupation of Japan for accomplished by March 1947. A resurgence of Japanese
military power was not longer likely. But that did not take the U.S. military
away from Japan. In the view of the USA, communist expansion in general, and in
eastern Asia in special, made it more necessary to keep large U.S. military
forces in the western Pacific. Unlike Europe, the United States were almost alone
in defending this part of the globe, and no Japanese military forces had been
reerected.
In his exercise of command in the Far East,
MacArthur wore at least three hats. As Supreme Commander Allied Powers, he was
the agent of the thirteen nations represented in the Far East Commission. This
Commission with its seat in Washington DC, directed the occupation of Japan. As
commander in chief, FEC, he had control over all U.S. military forces army, navy,
and air force in his command. And, as commanding general, U.S. Army, Far East, he
had direct command of all army forces in FEC.
Far East Command was a unified combatant
command. This had been described in the National Security Act of 1942 as a
military command which had broad, continuing missions under a single commander
and which was composed of forces from two or more military departments. The
military departments assigned forces to the combatant commands. FEC had forces
from all three military departments - Navy, Army, and Air Force. The
responsibility for their support and administration would be assigned by the
Secretary of Defense to a military department. For Far East Command, it was the
Department of the Army that had this responsibility. The operational chain of
command was from the President to the Secretary of Defense to Commander in Chief
FEC.
The most important commands under Far East
Command, by early 1950, included U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, the
Eight Army, Far East Air Forces, and the area commands; Ryukyus, Marianas-Bonins,
and the Philippines. The primary mission of the FEC was the defense of its area
of operations, a geographical region including Japan, the Ryukyus, the Marianas,
and American bases in the Philippines.
The kind of war the Far East Command had planes
for and probably was prepared for was a grand scale war with Soviet Union and
other communist states. This was laid down in the United States operational plan
Changeable and the similar plan made for FEC called Gunpowder. In FEC plan the
anticipated development in case of war was an attack on Japan itself from the
Soviet Union and its allies. To meat this threat, FEC had more than 500 modern
fighter aircraft, large Anti Air Artillery units, and four army divisions grouped
to stop an aerial and land invasion of Japan.
Did the Far East Command with its world famous
boss, General Douglas MacArthur, feel any responsibility or did they have any
commitments to the defense of the Republic of Korea? FEC established in 1946 a
plan for a possible reinforcement of Korea called "Baker 61". It had several
editions in 1946 and 1947, and went trough several revisions in 1948. As of March
1948 the plan included almost 13,000 soldiers and 2,000 vehicles to be moved from
Japan to Korea. There was also a "Baker 62" and a "Baker 63" for the same years
as "Baker 61", but these plans were for a possible evacuation from Korea.
As the United States came to an agreement with
the Soviet Union and withdraw their troops from Korea, the cold war became even
tuffer. FEC got more concerned with Japan but had not forgotten Korean. CINCFE
sent a signal to the Department of the Army regarding Korea five months before
the outbreak of the Korean War. The military considerations in the signal are
very clear:
Existing security forces of ROK are adequate and appropriate to accomplish
requirements of concept discussed in Part I. An Air Force is not rpt not
essential to maintenance of internal order and border patrols nor is it essential
to offering "token resistance to invasion from the North." A serious Soviet
Effort to seize South Korea could not be stopped in any event; and although an
Air Force would increase capability of ROK to resist invasion by North Korean
forces, it would at the same time unquestionably increase possibility of either
an all-out "local" war or aggravated embroilment at the border, now limited to
relatively minor clashes. Major military factor from the FEC viewpoint is JCS
decision stated in ref d that any offensive operations U.S. might conduct on
Asiatic continent would most probably by-pass Korean Peninsula."
Far East Command feared an invasion of South
Korea, but primarily from the Soviet Union, a much bigger enemy than North
Korea.
Also in the minutes of a committee called the
Joint Committee, there are no doubts what the FEC had at its attention. This
committee was FEC highest-ranking committee for joint purposes and had Chief of
Staff Major General E. M. Almond as its chairman. Usually the Joint Committee met
once a month and the four last meetings before the war was held 7 March, 11
April, 9 May and 6 June, with the next meeting planned for, but never to take
place, at 11 July 1950. The minutes from these four meetings do not mention the
word Korea, and there are no sign of any planning or training for other
activities than conducting the work as occupational force of Japan. The main
discussions had to do with topics like dependent housing, initiation of major
construction work at Okinawa, movement of Anti Air Artillery units to the areas
to be defended by them, evaluation of a specific exercise, frigates as radar
picket ships, status of amphibious training, withdrawal of Army Forces from the
Marinas, and a report of Communist activities. There were also more trivial
matters like data gathering concerning allegations on such matters as "morale,
health and welfare, venereal disease, inadequate housing, etc., etc.", change
from winter to summer uniforms, Armed Forces Day, 4 July parade on the Plaza in
Tokyo, Anti Air Artillery units to comply with the uniform regulations, and have
all recreational facilities available to the colored troops.
General Headquarters Far East Command was
organized as most general headquarters with a Commander in Chief, a Chief of
Staff, a Transportation Section, and the four G's; G-1 Personnel, G-2
Intelligence, G-3 Operations, and the one of particular interest to this study,
G-4 Quartermaster. G-4 was before the North Korean attack organized with five
divisions; Administration, Plans and Operations, Supply, Construction and Real
Estate, and Petroleum. The only change made due to the developments in the first
part of the Korean War, was the establishment of a Korean Economic Aid division.
This was done 1 October 1950 as the responsibility for general staff supervision
of the non-military supply program for Korea was assigned to G-4.
During the months prior to Korean hostilities,
G-4 was concerned with developing basic logistic data necessary for complete
planning in FEC. A review of existing plans was in process to determine their
logistical feasibility. G-4's command report for the first ten months of 1950 was
very straight forward saying: "At the time [25 June 1950] there were no plans or
studies of any sort covering possible operations in Korea in light of the lack of
theater mission therefore."
Japan Logistical Command was authorized to keep
on hand 30-days operating level and 30-days reserve, a total of 60 days of
stocks. The San Francisco Port Oversea Supply Division, as the main supplier of
FEC, and the Japan Logistical Command had agreed to an order and shipping time of
120 days. This time allowed for preparation of a requisition, mailing time to the
Oversea Supply Division, edit and extract by the Oversea Supply Division,
dispatch to a source of supply for processing and shipment, transportation to the
port, assembling and loading at the port, sailing and unloading time. This meant
that Japan Logistical Command at any moment could have a 180 days of stocks or on
order of any item.
What was the actual logistical situation in FEC
in the months just before the North Korean attack? A "list of topics concerning
Ordnance Service in FEC that may be of possible interest to the JCS", is sent in
a letter from G-4 FEC, dated 23 January 1950. The first item put forward in the
letter, is the Ordnance Automotive Program. This program has participated in
rebuilding considerable quantities of engines and automotive assemblies. From 1
January 1949 an appreciable number of completely rebuilt vehicles were
accomplished. In the letter, "It is anticipated that line production of vehicles
at Oppama during 1950 will meet Far East Command Ordnance vehicle requirements.
However, complete replacement of vehicles will require a three year program."
FEC also wrote to the JCS that in the interest
of economy, maintenance support mission for the FEC in Japan for armament and
automotive equipment has been assigned to Eight Army as "a Centralized Ordnance
Depot" maintenance. "Eight Army depot armament rebuild facility (Tokyo Ordnance
Center - 22nd Ordnance Service Battalion) have been rehabilitated and placed into
full scale operations capable of supporting the Far East Command, including the
equipping of EA infantry divisions reorganized under the new "N" series T/O&E's.
Much of this equipment was obtained from the roll-up and through reclamation."
This "roll-up" had been going on since the end
of the Second World War and must have had its impact on the Korean War. In the
Pacific in special, a lot supplies were scattered over the Pacific islands in
late 1945 as the troops were sent home. FEC reported to JCS that roll-up of
ordnance excesses from Korea, Philippines, and Okinawa had been completed. The
major portion of excess supplies on Guam and Saipan had been shipped out, with
the bulk of these supplies sent to Eight Army in Japan, and some to the Zone of
Interior.
One thing was to finish the roll-up, quite an
other to maintain what the forces in FEC had, in functional order. In order to
conserve maintenance and repair resources, all maintenance and repair operations
had to be concentrated on insuring reliable and efficient operation of equipment
destined for operational use. Repair and maintenance efforts would not be
expended for "window dressing". Maintenance was in the U.S. forces divided into
three different levels or areas. Organizational Maintenance was the
responsibility of, and performed by, a using organization on its own equipment.
This consisted normally of inspecting, cleaning, servicing, preserving,
lubricating, and adjusting as required. It could also include minor parts
replacement when it did not require highly technical skills. Field Maintenance
was authorized and performed by designated maintenance activities in direct
support of using organizations. This would normally be limited to maintenance
consisting of replacements of unserviceable parts, subassemblies or assemblies.
Depot Maintenance was the repair of materiel that required a major overhaul or
complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies, and/or the end item. Such
maintenance meant the use of more extensive shop equipment and personnel of
higher technical skill.
So as the North Korean attack came closer to its
D-day, the logistical resources were enormous in a Command prepared for the big
war.
A NAME="fast">
Fast reactions to a sudden attack
The difference between peace and war is normally
enormous. Physical and mental prepared for an attack, and what kind of attack? To
change from peace to a war, is very difficult. And it is even worse to change
from peace to a war if you are not prepared for. It is of course no help that the
attacker tries to hit as fast and efficient as possible, like an attacker always
will try to do. In the beginning of the Korean War it was not the defender who
could chose when, where and how the war should be conducted.
President Truman decided to speed up shipments of military equipment to Republic
of Korea under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program at a meeting in Washington
DC in the evening of 25 June. He also decided to move The Seventh Fleet, then in
Philippine Waters, towards the Asia mainland. In a teleconference with Pentagon
the same night Washington time, mid afternoon Monday 26 June in Tokyo, MacArthur
received authority to send a survey party to Korea and to send whatever
ammunition and equipment might be necessary to enable Republic of Korea forces to
hold the Seoul-Kimpo-Inchon area. He should also provide the air and naval cover
to ensure the safe arrival of that equipment and to permit the evacuation of
American civilians. After another meeting on Korea in Washington DC in the
evening of 26 June MacArthur and his staff were informed by the JCS via a
teleconference. All restrictions preventing FEAF from supporting and assisting in
the defense of Republic of Korea territory were lifted for operations below the
38th parallel. Also naval forces might be used without restriction against
aggressor forces in coastal waters and sea approaches to Republic of Korea. With
the second resolution in the Security Council 27 June 1950 the USA had an
international and legal right to use their military force in the Republic of
Korea in a manner they wanted.
One of the first operations was the evacuation
of nearly 2000 U.S. nationals from the Republic of Korea 29 June. Half of them
were evacuated with the use of Far East Air Force C-54's, and nearly 900 went
aboard a Norwegian ship at Inchon. They were evacuated to Japan where they were
given the necessary assistance. Itazuke Air Base, as the air base nearest to
Korea, was not big enough for all transport and patrol aircraft needed for the
evacuation. Ashiya Air Base near Itazuke was therefore taken into use, first for
six B-26 to fly reconnaissance and cover missions, and later for C-54's. F-82's,
that had enough range for patrol work, were moved from Yokata and Naha air bases
to Itazuke.
In a matter of hours after they had completed
the evacuation program of dependents and nationals from Korea, transport aircraft
started to haul badly needed personnel and supplies from Japan to Korea.
Personnel from the Eight Army Air Transportability School were called to
supervise the loading of aircraft based in Japan and the aircraft that came in
from other parts of FEC. The first fourteen-day period brought an average daily
lift of 185,000 lbs. of cargo into Korea.
29 June 1950 Truman authorized MacArthur to use
certain army forces to furnish essential logistic services and hold a port and an
air base in the Pusan-Chinhae area. Restrictions against air attacks on targets
in North Korea were at the same time lifted. 30 June marked the day for Truman's
authorization for the use of Army units in ground combat. The hope that it would
be enough to support Republic of Korea with material was dead. Soldiers from all
four of the U.S. military services were needed.
There are several indications that MacArthur
ordered his troops to get ready to move to Korea before Truman gave the
authorization for the use of Army units in ground combat 30 June. The "Good News"
article 1 Aug about Transportation Superiority quoting the Transportation Officer
of GHQ FEC stating that two - 2 days after the North Korea attack (27 June), " .
the Transportation Service were suddenly given the immediate and stupendous task
of moving thousands of troops and hundreds of thousands of tons of supplies and
equipment into Korea; and " (MacArthur leadership! Philippines!)
Far East Command had the possibility of using
Eight Army's teleconference facilities for communication with Washington DC, as
well as it had its own communication system with all subordinate commanders of
Army, Air Force, and Navy in the Far East. The connection to Korea was via the
State Department operated Seoul terminal on a radio-teletype circuit and a manual
radio circuit. When the war started, a manual radio circuit mounted in a truck
was safely moved from Seoul to Suwon to provide a limited communications
facility. Amateur radio operators in Korea and Japan were most cooperative and
handled much official traffic during the first few weeks. Signal personnel and
radio equipment were dispatched 29 June from Tokyo to Suwon by air to establish
another radio circuit. During the rapid evacuation of Suwon, some of the signal
equipment had to be destroyed to prevent capture by the enemy. Other signal
equipment were lost 30 June in a crash of a transport aircraft (a C-54) near
Pusan. Additional equipment was moved by air, water, and rail to Taejon to
provide increased facilities from Korea to Japan. This was later moved to Taegu
to support the new command, Eight U.S. Army in Korea (EUSAK). A large portion of
existing communications facilities within South Korea and between Japan and Korea
had to be rehabilitated and modified for military use.
When the bright Sunday morning of June 25th
brought news of Communist aggression in Korea, many started looking for a map.
The planners needed maps showing towns, transportation routes and rivers. For the
first forces to arrive in Korea, there were no good maps. This lack made it
virtually impossible to travel prudently, communicate, or fire artillery
effectively at the elusive enemy. The maps that were available had neither
contours nor grid systems and were printed in the Korean language and
calligraphy. At best, the maps were crude sketches. FEAF assigned with the
bombardment of enemy troops and supply lines, needed good maps. The solution was
the Engineer Base Topographic Battalion in FEC that together with FEC Printing
Plant leaped to the task of producing maps. Between 28 June and 15 July they
produced 9,5 million press impressions from 370 different maps. In the same time,
more than ten million leaflets were also produced and air dropped in an effort to
try to encourage the morale of the South Korean Army and civilians. As the "Good
News" report of 29 July 1950 said: "We've never pinned a medal on a map, but try
to fight a war without one."
Tachikawa and Ashiya Air Force Bases were the
primary bases for the airlift from Japan to Korea. Eight Army were the absolute
biggest user of the airlift. In an order for the Korean airlift 17 July from
General Headquarters Far East Command, Eight Army were given 70% of the capacity,
while Far East Air Forces were given 20%, and GHQ kept the last 10% for them
selves. If one command had requirements exceeding the allocation, readjustment
would be made by G-4 in coordination with the commands concerned. GHQ and Eight
Army were also ordered to maintain a liaison officer at Ashiya. The liaison
officer from Eight Army was also to be responsible for the Eight Army emergency
supplies at Ashiya.
The attack had necessitated G-4 with the
immediate preparation of a logistic directive to support the operation. He was
concerned with assignment of responsibilities for provision of support and to
include restrictions on depletion of Eight Army stocks. Because of the pressure
of time and in order to assure maximum flexibility of operations and minimum
interference with exercise of command responsibilities over supply, it was
decided as a matter of policy to keep directives to a minimum both in length and
number. Alteration of existing working supply policies and procedures would only
happen when it became strictly necessary to enable provision of necessary
support.
To G-4 it was of the utmost importance to be
able to plan future requirements. To do this, the data in a publication
called "FM 101-10" were used. Some of the data in FM 101-10 were used to compute
requirements for tonnage to be moved by rail in Korea and to subsequently the
number of locomotives and rolling stock needed. Generally, G-4 felt that these
determinations of requirements continued to be adequate, and that at least
concerning railroad equipment, the factors in FM 101-10 were sound when properly
applied.
As earlier mentioned, G-4 GHQ FEC put emphasis
in his logistics directive to assure maximum flexibility of operations and
minimum interference with exercise of command responsibility over supply. Maximum
discretion was said to be left to the major commands. Somehow this directive
could not have reached those who was suppose to use it. Several messages
concerning logistics from subordinate commands to GHQ strongly indicates this.
One of them was sent from Commanding General Marbo Guam asking for permission to
ship one available oil fired bakery oven from Guam to Okinawa, where it was badly
needed. On 29 July 1950 CINCFE granted authority to Commanding General Marbo Guam
to ship the bakery oven. The names of two Brigadier Generals, one of them
Adjutant General and the other Quartermaster, are to be found on the signal with
the approval. In this message as well as other answers from GHQ concerning
details, no one said a word about not sending such signals and nothing
about they could take the decisions themselves. And this was what they called
war?
The opening of the foreword of the Assistant
Chief of Staff G-4 command report 1 January 50 trough 31 October
1950 speaks for itself as a conclusion to what the Korean War meant to the
logistics of GHQ FEC:
"The onset of the Korean conflict, 25 June 1950, had little effect on the overall
mission and functions of the
section. The transition of the G-4 Section from a staff section engaged in normal
peacetime duties to that of a
staff section supervising and planing active operations was accomplished with the
minimum of effort
resulting in the maximum of efficiency."
Eight Army moves from Japan to Korea
Almost one third of the U.S. Army's fighting
forces were stationed in the Pacific Theater. Of these, more than 90
percent were stationed in Japan as part of Eight Army. To be able to fight the
North Korean Peoples Army, they had
to be transferred to the Korean peninsula.
The 7th, 24th, and 25th Infantry divisions, and
the 1st Cavalry Division (actually infantry) were in Japan, with the 29th
Regimental Combat Team in Hawaii. All of the divisions were filled with
relatively new replacements and were in a poor state of readiness for the war
that came in Korea. For economic reasons, and with only one exemption, the 24th
Regiment, all of the regiments had only two of their three infantry battalions,
and the artillery battalions also were short one of their firing batteries.
Charles M. Bussey served as a company commander
of the 77th Engineer Combat Company in Japan from May 1950 and well into the
Korean War. In his biographic book, Firefight at Yecon, Courage & Racism in the
Korean War, he is mainly concerned with defending black soldier's achievements in
the war, and obtaining justice for them. He gives a very colorful picture of the
general occupation duty of soldiers in Japan. "Occupation meant occupying the
best of Japanese commercial, residential, and recreational facilities, holding a
glass in one hand and a Japanese girlfriend, or moosimae, in the other, and
seeing how much food and drink one could indulge in and how much hell one could
raise. . The only fighting that U.S. soldiers engaged in was negotiation a price
for a single night's favor, for professional services on a month-by-month basis,
or for Noritake china and Mikimoto pearls. Eight Army and the Supreme
Headquarters gloried under the clouds cast by two atomic blasts. A future war was
impossible; an immediate war, unthinkable. Training was conducted accordingly. It
was slipshod and routine - not a serious or focused professional activity. . A
large number of lower-ranking enlisted men were products of the 1948 draft.
They loved their fat, tomcatting life and reenlisted in overwhelming numbers. .
The Army of Occupation was in bad shape. The general physical condition of the
troops was poor, morale was low, and the general level of intelligence was
reduced."
Also the Army had a lot of goods in storage. As
an example they had 38,599 wool serge trousers in excess. CINCFE on behalf of
Eight Army requested DA Washington DC 6 April 1950 for authority to transfer the
trousers to a program called Incentive Goods Program for Japan. An other message
18 May 1950 to and from the same agencies requested the sale of 30,000 newly
renovated cotton mattresses, which were in access at a quartermaster storage in
Japan. The normal time for handling this kind of requests in a military
bureaucracy should indicate that both trousers and mattresses still were in Eight
Army storage 25 June 1950, for use to appropriate military purpose.
The 24th Infantry Division was the first
division to be sent to Korea, starting on 1 July. Along with the severely
beaten Republic of Korea Army, the division fought a series of delaying actions
to slow the North Korea advance. The 25th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry
Division started landing in Pusan on 10 July. The 29th Regimental Combat Team
from Hawaii arrived in Korea a few days later.
"Our job is to get things moved -- to the right
place and at the right time! And when I say "things", I mean anything .from soup
to 100-ton locomotives." These were the words of the Transportation Officer
General Headquarters Far East Command in a interview in the middle of July 1950.
Until three weeks before he made his statement, his and others job were pretty
much routine and consisted primarily of moving personnel and cargoes in support
of the occupation forces in Japan and normal support of U.S. Forces in Guam, the
Philippines and Okinawa.
The 2nd Transportation Medium Port in Yokohama,
operated by Eight Army, was just after the North Korea attack placed on a 24 hour
per day operation. In less than a month it had more than doubled the amount of
cargo shipped out. In, addition, several other military ports were organized at
strategic locations in Japan to facilitate the urgent outloading of men and
materials for Korea. Scores of troop trains and freight trains carrying military
cargoes funneled into these ports from all sections of Japan. The 8010th
Transportation Military Railway Service in Yokohama handled the complicated job
of regulating these trains.
By the end of August approximately 500 persons
were moved daily from Sasebo to Pusan on the established ferry service. Assistant
Adjutant General at CINCFE meant that length of the trip necessitated meals to be
provided. He therefore requested arrangements to be made as soon as possible to
provide two hot meals daily on outbound trip and meals as necessary on inbound
trip. Subsistence would be provided by Army at Sasebo and turned over to Navy
account.
One of the units to be moved to Korea was the
77th Engineer Combat Company. They got their orders at 2330 10 July. At 03.00 11
July the company was organized for departure and boarded a train at Gifu on
Honshu which took them to the port of Sasebo. Before departure, the company's
missing (T/O&E) items included a bulldozer and a dump truck. These items are not
mentioned later in Bussey's book, so they probably received them before leaving
Japan. The voyage from Sasebo to Pusan onboard the Isikawa Maru started in the
evening of 11 July after they had received 108 ex-prisoners form the Eight Army
stockade. All of the soldiers were drug offenders released to go to Korea. The
only map Bussey had with him as Company Commander was one that had appeared one
week before on the back of Stars and Stripes, the official newspaper for the U.S.
armed forces. The Isikawa Maru docked at 0700 hours the next morning in a very
summer hot Pusan Harbor. Bussey was quite disgusted when the captain told him
that the dockworkers (longshoremen and stevedores) were on strike, and would not
off-load the ship. Three of the Non Commissioned Officers (NCO) in the company
had been in port battalions during the Big War. These took the lead in the
off-loading. Meanwhile personnel from the unit experienced with trains, went up
town and got hold of a train and brought it down to the Jetty. At 1500 hours,
less than 48 hours after the order to move to Korean where received, the unit
with all equipment were aboard the train, checked, blocked, and ready to roll on
to a station called Kumchon and the awaiting action. About 0800 hours in the
morning of 13 July, they pulled into Kumchon. One of the company officers went
searching for and found the ration breakdown point, engineer supply depot, and
ordnance small arms supply point. The company could finally establish its
camp.
The Army troop strength in Japan was down to
51,800 by the end of July 1950, further reduced to 30,000 one month
later, with only 20,000 in the end of September 1950. They were according to GHQ
FEC: "Service support and administrative units to provide support of occupation
and support of forces in Korea."
One of the biggest challenges for Eight Army
logisticians were to provide soldiers from all three services with Service
Support both in Japan and Korea, as well as the rest of FEC. This was not a new
task commencing with the Korean War, but had been the established order for some
time. The service support included subsistence, mainly food, to Far East Air
Forces and Naval Forces, Far East. During July 1950 the Air Force received
642,140 rations worth $ 968,215, while the Navy received only 7,080 rations.
Before the middle of August, FEC had sent over
to Korea more than 8,000 radio sets ranging from "walkie talkie" to fixed station
equipment, as well as more than 50,000 miles of wire of wire of various sizes and
composition. A large portion of this must have been for the Korean Army.
Bussey's 77th Engineer Combat Company was not
lacking much when it came to specialized tools, equipment, and weapons. He is
describing his officers as wonderful and first class, both those he had in his
company in Japan, and those he received later as replacements in Korea.
It is very likely Eight Army would have been
pleased to have had more tanks available in their fight against the
North Koreans. FEC received an offer 8 July 1950 of 19 tanks from the Philippine
Armed Forces. MSTS of Western Pacific was requested to provide necessary
shipping. The arrival of the tanks in Korea was estimated to take 30
days.
In a memorandum 11 July for General Wright at
General Headquarters Far East Command, one of his subordinate officers, pointed
to likely need for replacements of M24 light tanks as they now had entered action
in Korea with the three companies sent there. These three companies were sent to
Korea with 17 M24 each, and additional four tanks as replacements were sent with
the companies. Available replacements were three tanks awaiting water lift, and
four more at Tokyo Ordnance Center. Other replacements had either to come from
reconditioning of M4a3s at Tokyo Ordnance Center, or from Zone of Interior on the
recently sent 8th Army requisitions for 60 light tanks. On the typed signal,
someone has written, "10 Tanks destroyed 2 damaged". The four M24's at Tokyo
Ordnance Center were not sent to Korea immediately. A signal from 8th Army 20
July requested the tanks released for shipment to Korea to meet urgent combat
needs.
In a memorandum 8 August from Major General
Almond to Lt General Ridgeway, Almond gave his comments to the anticipated combat
loss rate of tanks in Korea. He said he understood the loss rate of tanks had
been relatively high when the quantity lost is compared to the small quantities
used in combat. However, in the future it is contemplated that the rapid increase
in number of tank units deployed and greater tank recovery capabilities of
EUSAK troops will lower the percentage loss rate. Almond also stated that the
North Korea had only limited combat aircraft at their disposal and were not
believed to have the anti-tank firepower of German Divisions of World War II.
He therefore recommended the factor of 15 % per month for combat and maintenance
losses of tanks used as a basis for supplying Far East Command. This memorandum
shows a relaxed attitude towards the replacements of tanks. At this time in the
war there seem to be enough tanks and spare parts.
Rebuilding tanks in Japan
A signal by command of MacArthur 9 August 50 to
CG EA, and CG EA in Korea, has a very interesting statement:
1. A study of the availability of tanks for equipping units in Korea indicates
sufficient shipments have been or are being made to satisfy current needs
there.
2. In view of the above it is desired that tanks now being produced from the
rebuild program at the Tokyo Ordnance Center be issued to the Seventh Infantry
Division as they become available.
The forces in Korea had enough tanks. Tokyo
Ordnance Center was rebuilding tanks, probably from tanks sent to Japan in the
years between World War II and the Korean War.
Towards the end of September, Japan Logistical
Command had found out the requirements for M46 medium tanks. According to a
message sent to San Francisco Port 24 September, the requirements for September,
October, November, December is 103 per month, plus 30 day emergency stock level
of 103 in Japan.
Upon the commitment of ground forces to action
in Korea, the Eight Army Quartermaster quickly assembled stocks, set up assembly
lines and went into quantity production on the PX Kit "50-in-1". It got its name
on the reason that it included comfort articles for fifty men for one day. The
kit contained articles like cigarettes, safety matches, candy bars, chewing gum,
tooth brushes, razors and blades, shaving cream, soap, writing paper, envelopes,
pencils and towels. It was distributed to the men at the front along with their
rations. Based on the life these soldiers had lived in Japan, the PX Kit must
have been a minimum of morale saver to the men fighting for their lives.
How much attention can you allow yourself to put
into Hammond organs in the middle of a war? One example of how well off they were
in Japan during the Korean War, were the repair of Hammond organs by Eight Army
Signal Repair Shop. Eight Army reported 10 May 1950 on the request of CINCFE that
they had 15 organs for repair awaiting parts required from Zone of Interior. On a
new request 13 September 1950, the answer were 22 September that they now had 12
Hammond organs in Signal Repair Shop awaiting connecting cables and tone cabinets
required from Zone of Interior.
Even in September, transportation were not
functioning as well as it could have done. A cargo of supplementary charges for
105-mm Field Artillery, requisitioned for delivery 9 September as urgently
needed, were still at Fairfield Air Force Base close to San Francisco 23
September. The priority designator on the shipment indicated immediate movement.
This shows problems with keeping track of what were where.
Logistics for an air force operating out of Japan
Far East Air Forces primary and only principal
mission as of 1950 was to maintain an active air defense of the FEC theatre of
operations. Among its subordinate missions, FEAF was charged to maintain "an
appropriate mobile air striking force" and to "provide air support of operations
as arranged with appropriate Army and Navy commanders." Since 1949, when the
Soviet Union had detonated its first atomic bomb, the general believe in
FEAF was that the Cold War could at any moment break into the flames of World War
III. Such a war would begin with air attacks against Far East air bases. Pearl
Harbor was not easily forgotten.
Far East Air Materiel Command furnished
logistical support for all USAF units in the Far East. The command post
and principal installation was twenty miles west of downtown Tokyo, at the
factories and airfield were the Tachikawa Aircraft Company had once built Oscar
fighters, but which was now the Tachikawa Air Depot.
The deployment of FEAF's subordinate air forces
reflected its primary defensive mission. It had 9 main bases in daily use, spread
out over its theatre of operations. The closest to Korea was Itazuke on Kyushu.
Three air bases were situated on the Kanto Plains around Tokyo; Yokota, Johnson
and Tachikawa. In addition there was Misawa also on Honshu, Naha and Kadena on
Okinawa, Andersen on Guam and Clark on the Philippines.
Its aircraft consisted of F-80C Shooting Star
jet interceptors, F-82 Twin-Mustang all-weather fighters, B-29 Superfortresses
conventional medium bombers, RB-29 photo planes (one squadron on Okinawa
belonging to the U.S. Strategic Air Command), RB-17 photo planes at Clark, two
squadrons of C-54 transport aircraft at Tachikawa outside Tokyo, and one squadron
of C-54's at Clark on the Philippines, and search and rescue units at several air
bases with SB-29 and SB-17. There were also two squadrons who flew weather
reconnaissance missions.
Far East Air Forces had 16,250 soldiers in Japan
by the end of July 1950. This number increased to approximately 25,000 by the end
of August, and to approximately 30,000 by the end of September.
For the performance of its defensive mission,
FEAF was provided with several aircraft control and warning groups, whose
personnel manned the large fixed-radar and aircraft-control facilities, which
were deployed throughout Japan.
The British Commonwealth air component in Japan
was a squadron from the Royal Australian Air Force. They flew F-51 Mustangs out
of Iwakuni Air Base on Honshu, and maintained liaison with FEAF.
Find out what Futrell has written about Air
Force logistics? No problems, is that the reason for not mentioning logistics in
other sources?
Supporting ships and aircraft of the Navy
The MSTS Western Pacific collected sufficient
ocean-going vessels in FEC waters. These were placed under the disposal of the
Commander-in Chief, Far East, for the immediate movement of anything and
everything desired. The Naval Forces Far East provided escort service for MSTS
convoys, and had the operational control of all vessels while they were in Korean
Waters.
In Japan itself, the U.S. Navy had two bases
called "Fleet Activities". The biggest was in Yokosuka south of Tokyo, and the
other at Sasebo on Kyushu only 130 nautical miles/240 kilometers from Pusan in
Korea. Most of the 2000 Navy personnel in Japan at the end of August 1950 served
at the two bases. By the end of August there were 2,500 Navy personnel, and by 30
September 3,500 in Japan.
It was not Commander Naval Forces, Far East, but
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor who was responsible for
the logistic support of forces afloat also in NAVFE area.
Sasebo became the most important forward area
base available to the Navy for replenishment of ammunition. But unlike the Army,
the Navy did not have adequate storage space in this area. Bombs, shells, powder
and components had partly to be stored in crowded open fields, thereby exposing
them to the elements and prohibiting proper segregation to insure safety. U.S.
Army Ammunition Depot in the Sasebo area consisted of 21 blockhouses and 13
caves with a capacity of at least 18.000 tons of explosives. In a signal 20
September 1950 from Commander NAVFE to Commander-in-Chief, Far East, he requested
that 6 caves and 10 blockhouses with stowage of 8,500 tons of ammunition be made
available to the Navy on indefinite loan basis. Of the capacity, it was noted
that the Army only used approximately ten percent. It took more than three weeks
before Commander Fleet Activities, Japan-Korea, was informed that he could store
his ammunition in the Army facility. The only remaining problem was that
the Navy used an entirely different system of marking its ammunition. The Navy
was therefore asked to furnish technical advisors and labor to assist in the
proper identification, storage and care of its munitions.
NAVFE and FEAF were cooperating much better than
the Navy with the Army in the Sasebo Area. Navy and Marine aviation units
attached to bases belonging to the FEAF were permitted to obtain ammunition in
the same manner as for USAF units. Requisitions and shipping documents indicated
that issues were made to Navy and Marine units, but the stocks were not
segregated.
18 May 1950 GHQ FEC wrote to Commanding General,
FEAF, and Commander, NAVFE, concerning a desire to obtain authority to
requisition a reserve of ammunition. The ammunition was to be in support of the
Theater Emergency Plan and should be enough for Air Force and Navy units at full
strength for 120 days. The answer from the Navy, five days after the North Korean
attack, was that Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet considered the ammunition
stock at Yokosuka and the war allowance carried by units of Naval Forces, Far
East and the Seventh Fleet to be more than the requirements. In addition there
was a considerable stock of ammunition at Naval Magazine, Guam for support of
NAVFE forces. The delivery system was also said to be good enough with one
ammunition ship in full commission, as well as other shipping suited to transport
ammunition.
One of the reasons that Commander in Chief U.S.
Pacific Fleet considered the ammunition stock in the FEC to be sufficient was
ammunition removed from 29 frigates returned to United States custody from the
Soviet Union. The frigates had been borrowed to the Soviet Union during World War
II. 1400 tons of 3", 40-mm and 20-mm ammunition was stored at a Army ammunition
dump at Ikego, four miles from Yokosuka, pending disposition of the 29 frigates.
The medical treatment could not be overestimated
as a morale building feature for the soldiers engaged in the Korean War. To know
you would get proper help if you were wounded, was very important in this war as
in other wars. The Inspector General, Medical, Navy Department, sent a staff
medical officer to Japan for most of September 1950 to inspect the navy medical
facilities in the Far East. His conclusion was:
"In general, the Navy Medical Department has successfully met the heavy
professional demands which have arisen as a result of the Korean incident.
Although all units have been understaffed and medical spaces overcrowded, it is
considered that the professional care rendered to patients is of high order.
Medical personnel are alert and industrious, and are performing their duties in a
commendable manner."
The officer also believed cooperation with the
Army and the Air Force to be excellent. At Sasebo the Army Medical
facility, comprising a 300 bed Dispensary, provided care for Navy and Marine
Corps personnel when these where over and above the capabilities of the Naval
Dispensary. In Yokosuka, a 50-bed dispensary had been made into a 800-bed
hospital, though it at the time of the inspection had more than 1,300 patients.
The majority of these had recent serious or critical battle casualties. With
minor exceptions, the general and the field medical supply systems,
had met requirements. One of his recommendations was that a study be conducted of
rigging a platform on the fantail of hospital ships for delivery of patients by
helicopter. There where two hospital ships in the Far East at the time of the
inspection, with a third to arrive in the middle of October.
You will go nowhere without fuel!
Petroleum, oil and lubricants were an absolute
necessity also in the Korean War. Trucks and tanks, aircraft and ships needed
fuel to move and oil and lubricants to function well. This importance of
petroleum to military operations in Korea was best emphasized by the fact that
sixty percent of all U.S. military tonnage moved to Korea the first months of the
war, was petroleum.
15 October 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed establishment of an Area Petroleum Office as a Staff agency of each
overseas commander responsible for supply of petroleum products and for overall
management of the petroleum programs of the three services within each overseas
command. In FEC the office functioned as a part of the Petroleum Division under
G-4, GHQ. It was no disadvantage in the war to come, that the personnel in charge
of the office in FEC all were specialists from all three services in the
petroleum field with experience from both commercial oil companies and World War
II.
The Petroleum Office in FEC was not only
responsible for military supplies, but also for civilian supplies. This meant
they had full control over both civil and military oil resources. To help the
office in civilian related questions, representatives for the civilian oil
companies were part of a petroleum advisory group. Oil products were still
rationed in the civil sector of Japan in 1950 due to that the supply, for some
reason, was smaller than the civil demand.
The products needed in military as well as civil
machines had to be imported to Japan, either as crude oil or as refined products.
In an effort to refine imported crude oil in Japan, a program for rehabilitation
of refineries was inaugurated in January 1950. The program could not have been
started at a better moment. By the outbreak of the Korean War, six rehabilitated
refineries refined 25,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Two more refineries
started operations in August 1950, raising the refining level to 33,000 barrels
of crude oil per day.
As long as Japan had no oil wells, it was
natural to have a large storage capacity in case of a break down in imports.
It might have been fear for a brake down in supplies that lay behind that the
military sector in Japan had more than they where allowed to have of petroleum
products. A Base Petroleum Report from 30 march 1950 stated that certain
petroleum products were in excess of the operating and prescribed reserve levels.
And in a letter from FEC to Eight Army 23 June 50 the teem was disposition of
excess petroleum products. But that was not all. Stocks of aviation gasoline
100/130 on hand 25 June 1950 in the FEC was 700 million barrels, representing 45
days operating stocks. In addition there were 75 days reserve stocks, or
approximately 140 million barrels above the quantity specified in CINCFE Plan
1-50 as reserve in the event of an emergency.
In a letter 26 July 1950 GHQ FEC adjusted the
level of petroleum supply to be maintained in terminal storage during the
emergency. The maximum level should be no more than 120 days of supply, while the
minimum level should be no less than 90 days of supply. It was recognized that
the storage facilities available for certain products in Korea, the Ryukyus and
the Philippines were not sufficient to satisfy the indicated requirements. These
deficiencies would then be provided for in Japan within the limits of storage
facilities available. The same letter emphasized the need each Sub-Area Petroleum
Office continuous reviewed individual requirements and reported the changes to
Area Petroleum Office.
Though FEC had more than they were allowed to
have of some oil products just before the Korean War, the resupply of some of the
consummated oil products during the first part of the war, were not very good.
For aviation gasoline 100/130 a cargo of 130 million barrels were scheduled for
delivery in September 1950. FEC Area Petroleum Office and the Armed Services
Petroleum Purchasing Agency in Washington DC had several contacts throughout July
and August discussing rapidly increasing consumption and the urgency of
accelerating the delivery of the first cargo of aviation gasoline 100/130. At a
teleconference 17 August Washington informed Japan that all terminal stocks of
grade 100/130 in the zone of interior had been depleted, that suppliers for only
two of the five cargoes had been found and that the first cargo would be
delivered on 3 September. This was of course not very good news, but it became
worse.
By the 4 September, with no aviation gasoline
delivered, the G4 in FEC sent out a warning signal:
The grade 100/130 aviation gasoline situation in the Far East Command is critical
due to the failure of the Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency to deliver
product that has been slated for since 6 June.
At his time, three of five airbases in Japan,
and the terminals, had less than 10 days of stocks. The two last bases had
17 and 18 days of stocks. The signal ends:
If the cargoes now expected to arrive on the eight and ninth of September
actually arrive on those dates, air operations will not be curtailed. If the
cargoes are delayed more than two additional days, all terminal stocks and
most base stocks will be depleted.
However, before operations had to be curtailed
because of a dangerously low level of aviation gasoline 100/130 in September, as
well as for aviation gasoline 115/145 in October 1950, the pipeline covering the
products was replenished through the arrival of products on order from Zone of
Interior.
Even with a stock of well over 500,000 55-gallon
drums in FEC inventory before the outset of the Korean War, it became apparent
that the existing stocks of drums were not sufficient to satisfy the demands for
drummed products with which to execute the emergency war mission. In July 1950,
an extensive publicity campaign was effected to conserve and reclaim all
containers being held by private individuals without authority. Further the Japan
Logistical Command placed orders on Japanese industry to produce over 350,000
55-gallon drums for immediate delivery. But this either was not enough. A study
held in September 1950 disclosed that an additional 456,000 drums would be
required of requirements for drummed products trough November 1951 were to be
satisfied. (It might be interesting to stop at the number "456,000". In military
logistics it normally would have been natural to say that an estimate in a study
was not so accurate as this, saying the required number of drums would be 455,000
or 450,000. Or to be militarily certain to have enough, to say the number was
500,000, which is a very nice and round number. But here it is precisely 456,000
drums!)
An other problem, which must have been a problem
of earlier wars, had to do with large and heavy drums and containers of packed
products. Prior to the start of the conflict in Korea, most of the packaged
lubricating oils were imported into FEC in 55-gallon drums, and greases were
packed in 400 pound containers. The difficulty of handling these products, as
packed, during a war emergency or even in peacetime, was apparent. In addition,
it was not very economic to issue these large quantities to units going into war.
FEC Area Petroleum Office ordered repacking of some of the packed products
through contracts negotiated with Japanese firms. In addition packed products
were requested from the U.S. in smaller containers.
Quality was not always certain thing when it
came to petroleum products, and even less so in a field environment. Experience
indicated that fuels and lubricants could immediately be suspected in cases of
mechanical failure, particularly as related to aircraft. The United States
Government petroleum testing laboratories located in Japan, Okinawa, Philippines
and Korea, were contributing factors in maintenance of quality on petroleum
products for all services in FEC. They assisted and supervised the blends of fuel
for alternate use when the recommended fuel was in local short supply. When delay
to shipment of aviation gasoline from the Zone of Interior prejudiced the stock
position in Japan, a laboratory recommended procedures whereby approximately two
days of aviation gasoline was made available by reclamation of sub-standard
aviation gasoline.
There were no petroleum troops in FEC before the
outbreak of the Korean War. As hostilities erupted the lack of this type of
troops was readily apparent. A petroleum platoon of one officer and 53 enlisted
men was hurriedly formed to operate the Pusan Petroleum Terminal. Qualified
civilian personnel borrowed from local commercial oil companies
accompanied them.
Japan's bases and industrial complex
An important part of FEC success in the first
part of the Korean War was Japan itself. Not only bases with docks and
other repair facilities for naval forces, and several airbases to support a big
airforce, but also Japan as a industrial power with storage capacity for all the
resources they had to import. U.S. bombing during the Second World War had
destroyed a lot, but not devastated the country.
In the overseas theaters maximum use should be
made of indigenous labor, materials, equipment and facilities. This was not very
difficult to achieve in Japan. Cheap. Plenty. Car Industry. Bases from World War
II. "Local procurement in Japan is authorized to the maximum extent
practicable."
Japan had by 1950 reassumed its position as the
leading industrial power in the Far East. Its steel production was 330,000 tons
in December 1949, and reaching an annual rate of more than 5 million tons for
1950. Japanese industry turned out 29.000 motor vehicles in 1949. Railway mileage
of Japan was over two and half times as great as that of all China combined. (Is
that an interesting fact?) Enough freight cars were available to move some 10
million tons of goods a month. In addition, the Japanese had 75,000 motor trucks
on hand and a fairly good highway system.
As soon as it was decided to use Pusan and the
railroad in Korea as a primary mean of transportation, G-4 FEC calculated the
need for locomotives and rolling stock. The great majority could be met by
equipment on hand in Korea. Necessary procurement of new equipment was in general
placed in Japan as was the rebuild program for locomotives and rolling stock. In
his command report G-4 has this description:
Japanese industry delivered equipment with
remarkable rapidity. The delivery of 50 flat cars of sufficient strength to
carry the M-46 and Centurion tanks was started within twenty days after the order
had been placed and was completed in time to meet the arrival of the tanks in
Korea."
An other example of the capabilities of the
Japanese industries was the delivery of 1,320 Red Cross Geneva Convention Flags
and 103,000 wool blankets to Republic of Korea Army during August. It was the
Economic Cooperation Administration who procured this from Japanese sources.
As late as 8 November 1950, minesweepers were
still a critical item in FEC. U.S. sweepers simply did not exist in the area in
adequate numbers, nor were any more expected from the USA in the near future. To
help this situation, 20 Japanese minesweepers (probably from World War II) had
been authorized for use in Korean waters on a full time basis. They were operated
by purged ex-naval Japanese officers who had the necessary experience to perform
a most valuable service. In the letter of 8 November, Commander Naval Forces, Far
East, took up a discussion whether to release these purged officers or not. His
recommendation was:
The release of these purged Ex-naval officers at the present time would
completely paralyze the present Japanese minesweeping effort in Korea. It is
therefore considered essential that all of the purged Ex-naval officers, who are
still employed, be retained in the minesweeping program.
Formosa and the fear for a parallel Korea?
Formosa was very much in the focus of Far East
Command and MacArthur. In an outgoing message to Department of the Army 29 May
1950 CINCFE warned that "The acquisition of Formosa by a Communist power
drastically increases the USSR threat to the United States military position in
the Western Pacific and requires a reevaluation of both FEC and JCS emergency
plans." FEC wanted heavy reinforcements to Okinawa and Clark Air Force Base (on
the Philippines) if Formosa was effectively utilized by a hostile power. These
reinforcements included six additional fighter wings and ten additional AAA
battalions, and even more forces to neutralize the island; described as an
"unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender."
Part of the background for sending such a signal
could have been an application from a civil transportation company
on Formosa. The application was discussed in the Joint Committee in FEC in its
meeting 11 April 1950. The company wanted to move its 20 C-46 to Japan based upon
information available to them that an air attack would take place on Formosa by
15 April.
General MacArthur, accompanied by appropriate
staff members from FEC, visited Formosa 31 July 1 August 1950 and held two
conferences with President Ching Kai-Shek and his senior commanders and staff.
The visitors were fully briefed of the situation. One of the major conclusions,
as written in a message to Department of the Army after the return to Japan, was
that all Chinese officials appeared willing and anxious to cooperate in any
manner desired by CINCFE. An other conclusion was that there was a real potential
in the Armed Forces on Formosa, but they required definite and substantial
improvement in equipment, organization, communications, training and in
developing sound methods of direct command responsibility.
MacArthur had also seen the need for direct
liaison between FEC and the Chinese Nationalist Government. Consequently a
liaison team was sent to Formosa 3 August, just two days after MacArthur's
return. The liaison team consisted of 17 officers with a Major General in the
lead. At the same time the G-4 section at GHQ was given several tasks of primary
importance, among them to determine the military supply and service requirements
for Chinese Forces, and provide staff supervision of activities of the technical
services to include Engineer, Ordnance, Transportation and Quartermaster.
Certain of the materials and equipment needed by
the nationalists, were available in Japan or from indigenous Formosan sources.
The directive was that Japanese materials and supplies should be utilized to the
maximum through direct negotiations, and financed by the Government on
Formosa.
A initial request based upon shortages of most
critical items came from Formosa as a radio message 8 August 1950. Among the
requested ordnance were seven million rounds of rifle and machine gun ammunition,
20,000 rockets for 2.36 inch rocket launcher, 750,000 rounds for mortars, and
40,000 rounds for 75-mm tank guns. This represented those quantities of
ammunition required for a 30 day stock for weapons in the hands of the Chinese
Nationalist Forces. FEC meant they could not deliver the ammunition. Subsequently
they sent a message to Department of the Army saying: "In furtherance of
decisions already made, as outlined in ourmsg CX 59840, 11 Aug 50, CINCFE
strongly urges that foregoing items of ammunition be shipped to Keelung, Formosa,
without delay, shipping information to be furnished here earliest." It could not
have been possible to be much tuffer in a message to your superiors in 1950, and
especially not the Department of the Army. This direct tone can indicate a fear
of an attack upon Formosa in the near future.
The U.S. Navy sold a reasonable large quantity
of ammunition to the Chinese Navy (Formosa) in the middle of August 1950. The
ammunition was delivered from 63rd Ordnance Depot at Ikego near Yokosuka and
consisted of more than 20,000 rounds of 3"/50 guns, 26,000 rounds of 40-mm guns,
and more than 620,000 rounds for 20-mm guns.
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